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THE MEANING OF THE TERM "TRIAL"
WITHIN THE OHIO RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
A TRIAL WILL BE THE FOCAL POINT of any lawsuit. Procedural steps of
the litigation process are classified as either pre-trial or post trial
stages. In the legal profession, where words are assigned specific mean-
ings, it would seem that a word such as "trial" would be specifically de-
fined. Yet no precise formula has been developed to differentiate be-
tween those components of a lawsuit that are part of the trial and
those that are not. Section 2311.01 of the Ohio Revised Code defines
a trial as "a judicial examination of the issues, whether of law or fact, in
an action or proceeding."'  While this statute attempts to limit and ex-
plain the function of a trial, it does not provide a clear cut definition
of what actually constitutes a trial. The precise definition has been left
to judicial decisions, and as will be seen, the cases have not been helpful.
Given the definition of a trial provided by the Ohio Revised Code, a
hearing on a motion could properly be classified as a trial.2 The term
"trial" has been held to include a hearing on a preliminary motion3 as
well as a petition for a new trial. 4 A hearing on a motion for summary
judgment, on the other hand, has been held not to be a trial."
The word "trial" is not defined in the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure.
This is due largely to the absence of such a definition in the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. The Ohio Rules were drafted using the Fed-
eral Rules as a model. The changes that were made in the Ohio Rules
by the Rules Advisory Committee, the drafters of the Ohio Rules, were
intended to reflect certain past procedural practices which the commit-
tee wished to retain. For the most part, however, the two sets of rules
are substantially similar, and in some cases, particular rules are identi-
cal.
The lack of a definition of a trial in the Federal Rules has not posed
any serious problems. Unlike the Ohio procedural system, the Federal
Rules do not employ the term "trial" to delineate any rights of parties in-
'Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2311.01 (Page 1954).
2 This line of reasoning was followed in Thompson v. Denton, 95 Ohio St. 333, 116
N.E. 452 (1917). The question in Thompson was whether an order fixing a receiver's
fees in a bankruptcy proceeding was a final order. The appellee contended that the order
granting the receiver's fees was not a final order and that the proceeding was not a trial.
Based on this contention, the appellee argued to the court of appeals that it had no juris-
diction to hear the appeal. The court of appeals agreed, but the supreme court reversed,
stating that "the term 'trial' as used in the constitution is broad enough to include any
judgment, final order or decree, not interlocutory in its nature, affecting the substantial
rights of a party to a chancery suit." Id. at 341, 116 N.E. at 455.
Thompson was expressly overruled by Forest City Inv. Co. v. Haas, 110 Ohio St. 188,
143 N.E..549 (1924). In Haas, the court held that an order of the court appointing a
receiver was a final order, but not appealable because the proceeding regarding the
appointment of the receiver was only ancillary to the trial.
3 Roscoe v. Kolb, 93 Ohio App. 352, 113 N.E.2d 746 (1953). See notes 215-28
infra and accompanying text. See also Carney v. Simmonds, 49 Cal. 2d 84, 315 P.2d 305
(1957), noted in 10 STAN. L. REv. 581 (1958).
' O'Connor v. Graf, 110 Ohio App. 398, 160 N.E.2d 374 (1959).
5 Morris v. First Nat'l Bank, 15 Ohio St. 2d 184, 239 N.E.2d 94 (1968). See note
212 infra.
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vOlved in litigation. Thus, there is no pressing need for such a definition
in the Federal Rules. Within the Ohio Rules, however, the word "trial"
is frequently used to determine the rights of parties. The lack of a work-
able definition of a trial in the Ohio procedural system has therefore
created problems not encountered in the federal courts.'
The first section of this Note will attempt to lay down some general
guidelines concerning the definition of a trial. The following section
will concentrate on the commencement of trial as that term is used in the
Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure. The final section will examine the prob-
lems which have arisen in connection with the motion for a new trial.
I. GUIDELINES FOR THE DEFINITION OF TRIAL
The Ohio Revised Code provides that a trial shall be a judicial exam-
ination.7 Based upon this criterion, the court in Logue v. Wilson s
stated that a hearing before a referee could not be regarded as a trial.
Under Rule 53, a referee has the power to hear testimony of witnesses
and admit evidence.9 The referee does not, however, possess the author-
ity to make ultimate findings of fact and conclusions of law. At the con-
clusion of a hearing, the referee is required to submit a report to the
court.10 The court then reviews this report and may either accept it as
the judgment of the court, modify it, or reject it completely." The im-
portant point is that the court makes the judicial examination of the is-
sues presented, not the referee. While the hearing before the referee
has all of the outward appearances of a trial, the referee is not capable of
conducting a judicial examination. Hence it cannot be a trial as that
term is defined by the Ohio Revised Code.
In Logue, the referee submitted a report to the court which the court
accepted completely as its own. The appellate court commented in dicta
that this practice was improper because the report did not provide the
judge with any facts upon which he could base any independent analy-
sis. 12  Hence, there was no judicial examination. Lacking this essential
element, there could not have been a trial.
6 It seems doubtful that the problems to be discussed in this Note concerning the term
"trial" were realized by the drafters of the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure. Neither the
staff notes accompanying the Ohio Rules nor the transcripts of the proceedings of the
Ohio Rules Advisory Committee even hint that problems involving the interpretation of
the term "trial" might arise. The term was probably used by the Committee in its con-
ventional sense, that is, an adversary proceeding, including pleadings, opening state-
ments by counsel, presentation of evidence, closing arguments, and submission to the
court or jury for final determination. These elements are set out in OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2315.01 (Page 1954), the section governing trial procedure. For a discussion of
section 2315.01, see notes 162-64 and accompanying text, infra.
7 Ouio REv. CODE ANN. § 2311.01 (Page 1954). See note 1 and accompanying text,
supra.
8 45 Ohio App. 2d 132, 341 N.E.2d 641 (1975).
9 OHIo R. Civ. P. 53(C).
0OHIO R. CiV. P. 53(E)(1).
SOHIO R. Crv. P. 53(E)(2).
12 The complete text of the referee's report to the court was as follows: "Case called.
Plaintiff and defendant in court. Show cause hearing heard. Judgment is rendered for
plaintiff for writ of replevin for property described." 45 Ohio App. 2d at 132, 341 N.E.2d
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A second element of the statutory definition of a trial is that the judi-
cial examination be of the issues. 13 An issue is defined by the Ohio
Revised Code as an averment arising from the pleadings of one of the
parties and controverted by the other. 14 Thus, the statutory definition
of a trial sets out not only who must conduct the examination, but also
what must be examined. The definition applied to the term "issue" is a
restricted one; it does not include every conflict between the parties,
but rather, only those that are framed by the pleadings. This techni-
cal definition of the term "issue" serves in turn to refine the Revised
Code's definition of a trial.' 5
Pleadings are defined by Ohio Rule 7(A) to include the complaint,
answer, cross claims, counter-claims, third party claims, and their cor-
responding replies.16 Since a trial must necessarily involve the exami-
nation of issues, and since issues may only be raised in the pleadings,
it follows that a trial must be initiated by one or more pleadings.
A hearing, on the other hand, is initiated by a motion to the court.
Ohio Rule 7(B) governs the making of motions. 7 Generally, a motion is
an application to the court requesting the performance of a specific act.
at 642. Since the "report" only contained a bare statement of the referee's finding, it
could not provide a basis for an independent analysis by the court. Thus, the judge could
do little more than rubber stamp the recommendations of the referee.
3 Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2311.01 (Page 1954).
14 Issues are defined in the Code as follows: "Issues arise on the pleadings where a
fact or a conclusion of law is maintained by one party and controverted by the other.
They are of two kinds: (A) Issues of law; (B) Issues of fact." Id. § 2311.02 (Page 1954).
'5 To preserve the identity of a trial, the term "issue" must be used in its technical
sense as defined in the Code. Id. If an issue was defined to mean every conflict be-
tween the parties, then an appeal could properly be regarded as a trial. Upon an appeal,
however, the judicial examination is centered on the assignment of errors that arose from
the proceeaings below, not on the issues presented in the original litigation. The judg-
ment rendered by the appellate court is based upon a review of the proceedings at the
trial, not on the merits of the parties' claims. Omo R. App. P. 12(A), (B).
Prior to the enactment of the Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure in 1971, however,
it was possible for a trial to be conducted in the appellate court. Such a proceeding
was called a trial de novo and it occurred when an appeal was based on questions of both
law and fact. Appellate Rule 2 expressly abolished the trial de novo. OHIO R. App.
P. 2. In a trial de novo the appellate court was not bound by the judgment of the lower
court, but instead, looked to the pleadings and the trial record to determine the out-
come. Criterion Serv., Inc. v. City of East Cleveland, 55 Ohio L. Abs. 90, 92, 88 N.E.2d 300,
301 (Ct. App. 1949). In Lincoln Prop., Inc. v. Goldslager, 18 Ohio St. 2d 154, 163, 248
N.E.2d 59, 63 (1969), the court analogized a trial de novo to a conventional trial in which
the evidence was based primarily on written depositions rather than on live testimony.
The final decision by the appellate court in a trial de novo was an original judgment by the
court, not merely an affirmation or modification of the lower court's decision. Mahrt v.
First Church of Christ Scientist, 75 Ohio L. Abs. 27, 142 N.E.2d 678 (Ct. App. 1956). The
appellate court has the ability to render a final judgment, but this judgment will be based
upon a review of the proceedings at the trial, not upon an examination of the issues raised
in the pleadings. Omo R. App. P. 12(A), (B).
16 OHio R. Civ. P. 7(A) provides:
There shall be a complaint and an answer; a reply to a counterclaim denominated
as such; an answer to a cross-claim, if the answer contains a cross-claim; a third-
party complaint, if a person who was not an original party is summoned under
the provisions of Rule 14; and a third-party answer, if a third-party complaint is
served. No other pleading shall be allowed, except that a court may order a
reply to an answer or a third-party answer.
17 OHio R. Civ. P. 7(B).
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When a motion is made, the judge may either dispose of it immediately
or schedule it for hearing.' 8 A pleading, while filed with the court, is
directed primarily to the opposing party for the purpose of making or
responding to a specific allegation. It is apparent, both by definition
and by separate treatment in the rules, that the drafters of the Ohio Civil
Rules intended pleadings and motions to be distinct types of documents.
Thus, it would seem that a trial could be distinguished from a hearing
merely by looking, to the method by which the particular proceeding
was commenced. While useful in some cases, this approach cannot be
applied universally. In practice it is often unclear whether a particular
document is a motion or a pleading. When ambiguity occurs, it is the
substance of the document, not its caption, that will determine the docu-
ment's classification. 19
A third necessary component of a trial, but one that is not mentioned
in the Revised Code's definition, is that the action or proceeding must
end in a final order or judgment.20 A final order, for the purposes of
this discussion, is one which affects a substantial right, determines the ac-
tion, and prevents a judgment.2' Once a trial has begun there are three
possible means of termination: (1) one of the parties will prevail, result-
ing in a judgment in his favor, (2) the parties may settle the case, volun-
tarily ending the lawsuit, or (3) the court may declare a mistrial. In
the first two instances the court will enter a final order, but in the
case of a mistrial, no final order will result.
The purpose of the trial process is to adjudicate finally the rights
of the parties involved in the dispute before the court. The entry of judg-
ment by the court satisfies this purpose. The entry is a final order
'S OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2311.09 (Page 1954).
19 "[A] pleading is judged, not by its title or form alone, but essentially by the subject
matter it contains. If the title is not descriptive of the subject-matter, it is the latter that
determines the character of the pleading. Substance prevails over form." Wagner v.
Long, 133 Ohio St. 41, 47, 11 N.E.2d 247, 250 (1937). Further complications are created
when one attempts to apply the "pleading or motion" test to a special proceeding. A
special proceeding is included in the statutory definition of a trial but is commenced by
application to the court. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2311.01 (Page 1954). The problems
related to special proceedings will be discussed in a later section of this Note. See
notes 165-200 infra and accompanying text.
20 A judgment, as the term is defined in the Ohio Civil Rules, is any decree or order
from which an appeal will lie. Onio R. Civ. P. 54(A). Therefore, a final order is a
judgment. For the purposes of this Note, the two terms, final order and judgment, will
be used interchangeably.
21 OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2505.02 (Page 1954) provides:
An order affecting a substantial right in an action which in effect determines the
action and prevents a judgment, an order affecting a substantial right made in a
special proceeding or upon a summary application in an action after judgment, or
an order vacating or setting aside a judgment and ordering a new trial is a final
order N :iich may be reviewed, affirmed, modified, or reversed, with or without a
retrial.
A "substantial right" has been defined as a legal right which is entitled to enforcement
and protection by law. Armstrong v. Herancourt Brewing Co., 53 Ohio St. 467, 42 N.E.
425 (1895). See In re Estate of Wyckoff, 166 Ohio St. 354, 358, 142 N.E.2d 660, 664
(1957). Although the Ohio Revised Code sets out four tests for the finality of an order,
the first test, relating to a trial in a civil action, is of primary concern; the second,
relating to special proceedings, is discussed in another section of this Note. See notes
183-85 and accompanying text, infra.
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that serves as a basis for the various post trial motions to the trial
court, as well as for an appeal of the trial decision to a higher court.
Since a mistrial results in no final order, however, it is neutral in its
effect upon the rights of the parties. The mistrial eradicates all that
has transpired since the commencement of trial, and the result is that, in
effect, no trial has been conducted.
22
Often a hearing will appear to be similar to a trial, leaving no dis-
tinct line of separation between the two. One illustration of this simi-
larity is the case of a pre-seizure hearing in an action for replevin. In
Fuentes v. Shevin, the United States Supreme Court held that the grant-
ing of a prejudgment writ of replevin in an ex parte proceeding, with-
out a hearing and prior notice to the other party, constituted a depriva-
tion of the defendant's property without due process of law.2 3 The court
held that the defendant had a right to a hearing, and that in this hearing
the plaintiff would be required to show the probable validity of his
claim.2 4 Under this analysis, the pre-trial hearing takes on many of the
characteristics of the trial itself. For instance, in Computer Leasing Co.
v. Computer & Software, Inc.,25 an Ohio court carried the Fuentes rea-
soning a step further and held that in the pre-seizure hearing the defen-
dant could raise not only those defenses directed to the issue of default,
but also any other defenses which would be available at trial. Although
the merits of the claim will be fully examined in the pre-seizure hearing,
the hearing will only settle the issue of possession for the interim period
before trial.26 The distinguishing characteristic between the pre-sei-
zure hearing and a trial is the fact that the pre-seizure hearing results in
no final order,2 7 and for that reason cannot be considered a trial.
The above examples serve to illustrate some of the basic character-
istics of a trial. While these features alone are not completely deter-
minative, they do help to distinguish a trial from other judicial proceed-
ings. The term "trial," however, should not be defined in the abstract,
but rather in relation to the purpose and intent of the particular rule
that employs the term. The rules use the term "trial" in different con-
22 In Newark Shopping Center, Inc. v. Morris Skilken & Co., 5 Ohio App. 2d 241, 214
N.E.2d 674 (1964), the court distinguished an order granting a mistrial from an order
granting a new trial. The appellate court held that an order granting a new trial favors
one of the parties, while an order of a mistrial favors neither party. Moreover, a new trial
entails a re-examination of the issues that were before the court in the previous trial. No
similar re-examination occurs in the case of a mistrial, since the first trial is considered a
nullity. But see Latimer v. Morris, 27 Ohio App. 2d 66, 67, 272 N.E.2d 494, 495 (1971),
in which the court noted that a motion for a mistrial made after the jury had rendered its
verdict would be taken as a motion for a new trial. Accordingly, the motion for a mis-
trial in such a situation would be a final order from which an appeal could be taken.
- 407 U.S. 67, 80-93 (1972).
24 Id. at 96 nn.32 & 33.
25 306 N.E.2d 191, 193 (Ohio C.P. 1973).
26 It should be pointed out, however, that although the merits of the claim will be
fully examined at the pre-seizure hearing, this will not preclude a re-examination at the
trial. Since the hearing will only decide the question of possession for the period until
trial, there is no res judicata effect on the parties at the subsequent trial.
27 Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2505.02 (Page 1954). For the text of section 2505.02, see
note 21 supra.
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texts, thereby giving different implications to the term. To develop a
rigid definition and apply it mechanically throughout the rules could
lead to results neither intended nor desired by the drafters of the Ohio
Rules of Civil Procedure. Therefore, the remaining two sections of this
Note will examine the concept of trial in the context of specific provi-
sions of the rules.
II. COMMENCEMENT OF A TRIAL
Under the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure, the commencement of a
trial is the point in the lawsuit at which the plaintiff's control over the liti-
gation is substantially reduced. Up to this point the court has little
involvement in the progress of the lawsuit. Excepting pretrial confer-
ences and hearings on preliminary motions, the court does little more
than supervise the actions of the parties. Once the trial actually begins,
however, the court's involvement in the lawsuit increases considerably.
As a result, certain actions by the plaintiff which may previously have
been done as a matter of right, may now be done only upon application
to the court.
Ohio Rule 41(A) states that the plaintiff may dismiss as a matter of
right at any time prior to the commencement of trial. 8 Such a dis-
missal is without prejudice to a future action involving the same parties
and the same claims. After the trial has commenced, however, the
plaintiff's right to dismiss the lawsuit without prejudice becomes condi-
tioned upon the approval of the court.29 If the dismissal is granted by
the court, most likely it will be done provisionally, upon the plaintiff's
meeting the terms and conditions proscribed.3 0 Yet as critical and impor-
28 Oso R. Civ. P. 41(A)(I) states in pertinent part:
[A]n action may be dismissed by the plaintiff without order of court (a) by
filing a notice of dismissal at any time before the commencement of trial unless
a counterclaim which cannot remain pending for independent adjudication by the
court has been served by the defendant or (b) by filing a stipulation of dismissal
signed by all parties who have appeared in the action. Unless otherwise stated
in the notice of dismissal or stipulation, the dismissal is without prejudice,
except that a notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication upon the merits when
filed by a plaintiff who has once dismissed in any court, an action based on or
including the same claim.
For the sake of discussion of this aspect of voluntary dismissals, it is assumed that
the lawsuit in question involves only one claim between two parties. Voluntary dis-
missal will be more complicated if multiple claims or counterclaims must be de-
termined in the litigation. It is also assumed that, for purposes of this section of the
Note, trial means a jury trial.
2 OHIo R. Civ. P. 41(A)(2) states in pertinent part: "Except as provided in subsection
(1) an action shall not be dismissed at the plaintiff's instance except upon order of the
court and upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper."
30 OHio R. Civ. P. 41(A)(2) authorizes the court to impose conditions on the plaintiff's
dismissal. These conditions usually will be the payment of court costs and the expenses
that the defendant has incurred to date. See note 47 infra.
The provisions of Rule 41(A)(2) should be distinguished from those of Rule 41(D).
Rule 41(D) provides that, after the plaintiff has dismissed his action, upon recom-
mencement, the court may stay the proceedings in the second suit until the plaintiff
pays the costs of the previous action. Rule 41(D), however, only covers "court costs"
and would not include attorney's fees or other expenses that the defendant incurred in
the previous action. See Yetter Homes, Inc. v. Coastal Cabinet Works, Inc., 234 F. Supp.
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tant as this stage of the trial process may seem, "commencement of
trial" has escaped definition in both the Ohio Revised Code and the
Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure.
A survey of other jurisdictions reveals that there are two major view-
points concerning the commencement of a civil trial. The first view is
based upon a strict definition of the word "trial," holding that a trial ac-
tually begins upon opening argument to the jury, or, in the event none
is made, then upon the presentation of the first evidence. 3' At first
glance, this first view would seem to be in accord with the Ohio Revised
Code's definition of a trial, limiting a trial to those components of the
procedure that relate directly to the examination of the issues. The
second view is based upon a more liberal concept of the word "trial."
This latter view goes beyond the mere examination of the issues and
encompasses all of the events that would occur in the courtroom on the
day set for trial. Thus, under the second view, a trial would be deemed
commenced upon the administration of the oath to the array of prospec-
tive jurors and would include the voir dire examination.31
This section will examine the above two interpretations of "com-
mencement of trial" to determine how the courts should construe this
phrase within the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure. For this purpose, the
commencement of a trial will first be examined in conjunction with Ohio
Rule 41(A)(1) (voluntary dismissal) to determine which of the two views
propounded best accomplishes the purpose of that rule. Thereafter,
this view will be applied to other rules employing "commencement of
trial" to determine whether a uniform definition should be applied
throughout the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure, or, if in the interest of
justice, a different meaning should be applied in different rules.
A. Rule 41(A): Voluntary Dismissal by Plaintiff
As has been previously stated, Ohio Rule 41(A) provides that a plain-
tiff has a right to voluntarily dismiss his lawsuit at any time before the
commencement of the trial.33 This limitation upon the plaintiff's right
to dismiss the action is relatively recent in Ohio.34 At common law the
plaintiff was permitted to take a voluntary dismissal in his case at any
time during the trial, up to the point at which jury rendered the final
568, 572 (E.D.S.C. 1964). Ohio Rule 41(D) is identical in form to the federal rule.
For construction of Federal Rule 41(d), see 5 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 10 41.16 (2d
ed. 1966); 9 C. WIucfrr & A. MILLER, FEDEnAL PRACTICE AN PROCEDURE § 2375 (1971).
[Hereinafter cited as Wmcirr & MITLEn].
31 Carvel v. Arents, 126 Cal. App. 2d 776, 272 P.2d 858 (1954); Marsch v. Southern
New England R.R., 235 Mass. 304, 126 N.E. 519 (1920); State v. Pancoast, 5 N.D. 516,
67 N.W. 1052 (1896). California has now codified this view. see notes 52-53 and
accompanying text, infra.
32 Accord, Jost v. Hill, 51 I11. App. 2d 430, 201 N.E.2d 468 (1964); Pratt v. Bishop,
257 N.C. 486, 126 S.E.2d 597 (1962); Kadota v. San Francisco, 166 Cal. App. 2d 194, 333
P.2d 75 (1958); Wilhite v. Agbayani, 2 Ill. App. 2d 29, 118 N.E.2d 440 (1954); In re
McIntyre's Estate, 78 N.D. 10, 47 N.W.2d 527 (1951).
31 OHio R. Civ. P. 41(A)(1). For the text of Rule 41(A)(1), see note 28 su pra.
34 The limitation imposed upon the plaintiff's right to dismiss was one of the changes
brought about by the adoption of the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure in 1970.
1976
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verdict.35  Moreover, dismissal at a late stage in the proceedings was
not a bar to the plaintiff's bringing a subsequent action against the
same parties on the same claim. Because the plaintiff's right to dismiss
the suit was almost completely unlimited, he was able to bring his law-
suit, uncover the defenses of his opposition during the course of the trial,
and then, immediately before the termination of the trial, dismiss the law-
suit.38 The plaintiff was then in a position to prepare a second case,
fortified with the knowledge of the strengths and weaknesses of his
adversary's case. The plaintiff could also use the voluntary dismissal
mechanism as a means of harassment, subjecting the defendant to enor-
mous expense in terms of both time and money by forcing him to defend
successive suits on the same claim.
Although the availability of the right to dismiss the action so late in
the proceedings gave the plaintiff an unjust advantage in the lawsuit
which many times led to abuse, it was regarded by courts as a right
inherent in the person bringing the lawsuit. Based upon the assump-
tion that no one was required to seek redress for a wrong done to him
unless he chose to do so, the plaintiff had the right to abandon the
suit whenever he desired.37 Since the defendant had no control over the
plaintiff's decision to sue, he had no standing to object to the plaintiff's
dismissal of the action. Only after the defendant had acquired substan-
tial rights in the litigation, could he raise an objection to the plaintiff's
practices. The defendant did not acquire any substantial rights in the
action at common law until the jury rendered its verdict.3 8  In the
modem procedural system the time for attachment of such rights has
been advanced to an earlier stage in the lawsuit.3 9
35 At common law, until the jury rendered its verdict there was no determination
of the issues. Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 454, 457 (1868). See also American
Electrotype Co. v. Kerschbaum, 105 F.2d 764, 765 (D.C. Cir. 1939). Once the issues were
determined, the plaintiff was foreclosed from dismissing the case. Taylor v. Alexander,
6 Ohio 145 (1833). Jacob Laub Baking Co. v. Middleton, 118 Ohio St. 106, 160 N.E.
629 (1928). See generally Head, The History and Development of. Nonsuit, 27. W. VA.
L.Q. 20 (1920); Comment, The Voluntary Nonsuit in Virginia, 7 WM. & MARY L. REv.
357 (1966).
36 The following passage illustrates the potential for abuse by the plaintiff:
The plaintiff could bring his action, carry it through several years of litigation,
subject the state and defendant to expense and loss of time, and then, having
uncovered all the defenses, at any time before the jury rendered its verdict,
assert his uncontrolled right to become nonsuit, leaving himself free to com-
mence another action on the same cause immediately.
Head, supra note 35, at 24.
37 The right to dismiss the lawsuit has been regarded as one of the means by which the
plaintiff was able to exercise control over the lawsuit. Goin v. Chute, 126 Ore. 466, 475,
270 P. 492, 494 (1928).
31 For the most part, the acquisition of substantial rights was equivalent to a verdict
for the defendant. After that time, by a bar of res judicata, the defendant had the
right to block the plaintiff in a subsequent lawsuit founded on the same claim.
3' In Medina v. Erickson, 226 F.2d 475, 483 (9th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S.
912 (1956), the court stated that a party has the right to dismiss unless the action has
proceeded to the extent that substantial rights have accrued to the defendant. In Medina,
an admiralty case, the court held that the mere payment of some pre-litigation costs did
not vest substantial rights in the defendant. The dismissal will be denied when the de-
fendant has materially altered his position as a result of the lawsuit. Marsch v. Southern
New England R.R., 235 Mass. 304, 126 N.E. 519 (1920). See Note, Exercise of Discretion
[Vol. 25:515
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A second reason for permitting the plaintiff to dismiss his case at
any time prior to the final verdict stems from the fact that the initial suit
was, for the most part, the only means of discovery available. As late
as 1853, there was virtually no procedure for discovery in Ohio. 40
To remedy this situation, the plaintiff often brought his first suit solely
for the purpose of "deposing" his opponent's witnesses. Once this task
was completed, but before the jury delivered its verdict, the plaintiff
moved to dismiss his case. He then had sufficient information concern-
ing his opposition to prepare a thorough prosecution of his case. As one
might imagine, this method of discovery was highly cumbersome and ex-
pensive for both parties. Although the trial dockets of that time were
not as crowded as they are today, this constant practice of relitigation
must have been taxing upon the courts.
With the introduction of modern discovery procedures, however, the
plaintiff no longer enters the courtroom unaware of the defendant's
case.4' By the date of trial, the parties will have had ample opportunity
to take depositions, submit interrogatories, and employ other methods of
discovery. The plaintiff will also have had the chance to evaluate the
relative merits of his own case. The inadequacy of discovery, therefore,
is no longer a valid reason for the largely unrestricted right of the plain-
tiff to voluntarily dismiss.
in Permitting Dismissal Without Prejudice under Federal Rule 41(a), 54 COLUM. L. REV.
616, 621 (1954). See also Roth v. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 2 F.R.D. 182 (S.D. Ohio
1942) (denying the plaintiff's motion to dismiss on the grounds that the defendant had ac-
quired substantial rights in the litigation after the filing of a motion for summary judg-
ment).
Under the modem rules of procedure, substantial rights accrue to the defendant once
he has been forced to come in and defend the suit. Thus, after the filing of an answer or
a motion for summary judgment (federal system) or the commencement of the trial (Ohio
system), the defendant has acquired rights in the litigation sufficient to cut off the plain-
tiff's ability to dismiss the action as of right. The rights acquired by the defendant are
not so substantial to completely deny the plaintiff dismissal without prejudice, but merely to
insure that such dismissal only will be granted when the plaintiff satisfies the conditions
imposed by the court.
40 Although equity did have some provisions for the use of discovery, such methods
were not available to parties in actions at law. Thus, until 1853, when law and equity
were merged in Ohio by the adoption of the Field Code, the plaintiff was unable to depose
an opposing party's witness in an action at law. Code of Civil Procedure of the State of
Ohio, § 3, 1853 Ohio Laws 57 (codified at OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 2307.02 (Page 1954)
(repealed 1970)). "The greatest steps forward in expediting the judicial process and
eliminating the sporting theory of justice occur in the area of discovery." Corrigan, A
Look at the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure, 43 Omo BAR 727, 733 (1970). See aLso Pike
& Willis, The New Federal Deposition - Discovery Procedure, 38 COLvM. L. REV. 1179,
1180-86 (1938).
41 OnIo R. Civ. P. 26(A) provides:
It is the policy of these rules (1) to preserve the right of attorneys to prepare cases
for trial with that degree of privacy necessary to encourage them to prepare their
cases thoroughly and to investigate not only the favorable but the unfavorable
aspects of such cases and (2) to prevent an attorney from taking undue advan-
tage of his adversary's industry or efforts.
Parties may obtain discovery by one or more of the following methods: depo-
sition upon oral examination or written questions; written interrogatories; pro-
duction of documents or things or permission to enter upon land or other prop-
erty, for inspection and other purposes; physical and mental examinations; and
requests for admission. Unless the court orders otherwise, the frequency and
use of these methods is not limited.
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This is not to advocate that the plaintiff should never have the right
to voluntarily dismiss his case.42 Situations might arise where the
plaintiff will need to dismiss the lawsuit without the danger that such
an action on his part will forclose his ability to recommence litigation
on the same claim at a later date. For example, such a situation would
arise when an essential witness for the plaintiff suddenly becomes un-
available, through no. fault of the plaintiff, on the day trial was scheduled
to begin.43 If the court refuses to grant any further continuances, there
is little the plaintiff can do. Without this essential witness the plaintiff
will be unable to properly present his case. If dismissal may only be
procured by an order of the court or by a stipulation of the defendant,
and neither is responsive to the plaintiff's plight, the litigant is forced
to choose between proceeding with a weakened case or dismissing the
suit with prejudice. Either way, the plaintiff runs the risk of losing an
otherwise meritorious claim. By retaining the right to dismiss the action,
the plaintiff may discontinue his suit and refile it at a later date.44  At
the time of dismissal the defendant will have incurred very little expense
that will not be recouped in the subsequent lawsuit.
Ohio Rule 41(A), governing voluntary dismissal by plaintiff, was
based upon Rule 41(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The
Federal Rule, however, is somewhat more restrictive in its treatment of
the plaintiff's right to voluntarily dismiss than is the Ohio Rule.
45
Under Federal Rule 41(a), the plaintiff may only dismiss his action, as
a matter of right, before the defendant either files his answer or moves
for summary judgment. Thereafter, the plaintiff may dismiss only by
leave of court or stipulation of all the parties involved in the action.
One of the reasons advanced for restricting the plaintiff's right to
dismiss his lawsuit has been to keep the defendant's costs to a mini-
mum .4 After the defendant files his answer or motion for summary
2 One of the primary reasons for allowing the plaintiff to withdraw his case is to en-
courage private settlements between the parties. This, in turn, will help clear the crowded
trial docket. Ohio Rule 41(A) was aimed at encouraging the voluntary termination of
lawsuits. See Standard Oil v. Grice, 46 Ohio App. 2d 97, 345 N.E. 2d 458 (1975).
4 This example was posed during a session of the Ohio Rules Advisory Committee
to illustrate the reasons for allowing the plaintiff an extended time period in which to dis-
miss the action without prejudice. Proceedings of the Ohio Rules Advisory Committee
at 38-39 (Nov. 21, 1968) (on file with the Ohio Supreme Court Library).
4The plaintiff's right to recommence his action after voluntary dismissal is also sub-
ject to the statute of limitations. A voluntary dismissal is not a failure otherwise than
on the merits to bring the matter within the protection of the savings statute. OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.19 (Page 1954). Manos v. Jackson, 42 Ohio App. 2d 53, 328
N.E.2d 414 (1974); Brookman v. Northern Trading Co., 33 Ohio App. 2d 250, 294 N.E.2d
912 (1972). For further discussion on the savings statute with respect to Ohio Rule 41(A),
see Browne, Voluntary Dismissal and the Savings Statute: Has Rule 41(A) Changed the
Law?, 23 CL.Ev. ST. L. REV. 215 (1974); Note, Pitfalls Associated with the Ohio Savings
Statute, 36 OMo ST. L.J. 876 (1975).
45 FED. R. Cw. P. 41(a) provides in part that, "[A]n action may be dismissed by the
plaintiff without order of court (i) by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before service
by the adverse party of an answer or a motion for summary judgment, whichever occurs
first. .. ."
4The thrust of Federal Rule 41(a), in abridging the plaintiff's common law right to
dismiss without prejudice, is to protect the defendant. Armstrong v. Frostie Co., 453 F.2d
914 (4th Cir. 1971). Thus, in Harvey Aluminum v. American Cyanamid, 203 F.2d 105
[Vol. 25:515
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judgment, a motion by the plaintiff to dismiss the lawsuit will only be
granted upon the plaintiff meeting the terms and conditions, if any, im-
posed by the court. The court will usually require the plaintiff to pay
court costs that have accrued as of the date of dismissal, plus any ex-
penses of the defendant that were necessary for the first suit but would
not have been necessary for a subsequent suit.47
Ohio Rule 41 extends the plaintiff's right to dismiss the action
(2d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 984 (1954), noted in 63 YALE L.J. 738 (1954), the
court held that once the defendant incurred considerable expense in preparing for a
preliminary hearing, the plaintiff no longer could dismiss the suit as of right. The court,
in a decision written by Augustus Hand, held that although the defendant had not filed
an answer or a motion for summary judgment, the issues of the controversy had been
raised and examined on their merits at the hearing for the preliminary injunction. The
court compared the expense and time required to prepare for the hearing on the injunc-
tion with that required for a hearing on a motion for summary judgment. The 1948
amendment to Federal Rule 41(a)(1) (adding the motion for summary judgment as cut-
ting off the plaintiff's right to dismiss where previously it could only be done by answer)
was meant to protect the defendant from considerable expense, and technical compli-
ance with the Rule by the plaintiff should not be allowed to defeat the purpose of the
amendment. 203 F.2d at 107-108.
In Tele-Views News Co. v. S.R.B. TV Publishing Co., 28 F.R.D. 303 (E.D. Pa. 1961), the
court, in reversing its previous opinion on rehearing, held that the defendant's motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) was equivalant to a motion
for summary judgment, thereby cutting off the plaintiff's right to voluntarily dismiss.
The court based its conclusion upon the similarity between a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and a motion for summary
judgment, both in effect and cost to the defendant in preparation. 28 F.R.D. at 308.
Thus, as illustrated by Harvey and Tele-Views, technical compliance with Rule 41(a) is
not necessarily sufficient to preserve the plaintiff's right to dismiss without prejudice when
the effect of the dismissal will be to work a hardship on the defendant. For a discussion
of the effects of Harvey and Tele-Views, see 1962 DUKE L.J. 285.
In Littman v. Bache & Co., 252 F.2d 479 (2d Cir. 1958) the Second Circuit cut back
on the broad pronouncement made in Harvey. In Littmnan, the defendant did not immedi-
ately file an answer, but instead, after securing a 3-week filing extension, moved the
court to transfer the case to another district. After the motion to transfer had been
argued twice, but before the case was transferred, the plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss.
The defendant then filed a motion to vacate the order of dismissal, which was granted.
On appeal, the court reversed the lower court's decision to vacate, holding that the plain-
tiff had a right to dismiss the action as long as the dismissal was filed before the defen-
dant had filed either an answer or a motion for summary judgment. The appellate
court declined to follow its earlier holding in Harvey, but instead, limited the applicabil-
ity of that case to those situations where the pre-trial proceedings went directly to the
merits of the case. Id. at 481. See also Toulmon v. Indus. Metal Protectives, 135 F.
Supp. 925 (D. Del. 1955).
Thus, unless in a situation similar to the facts in Harvey, where the merits of the case
have been fully explored in pre-trial proceedings, the plaintiff will not be precluded from
his right to dismiss his case where neither an answer nor a motion for summary judg-
ment had been filed. In most cases Federal Rule 41(a) will be given a strict reading. D.C.
Elec., Inc. v. Narton Corp., 511 F.2d 294, 297 (6th Cir. 1975). See also Plain Growers,
Inc. v. Ickes-Braun Glass, Inc., 474 F.2d 250 (5th Cir. 1973); Sheldon v. Amperex Elec.
Corp., 52 F.R.D. 1 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
47 In Goldlawr, Inc. v. Shubert, 32 F.R.D. 467 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), the court permitted the
plaintiff to dismiss the action pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2) on the condition that the plaintiff
pay the reasonable costs and attorney's fees of the defendant. Because the parties were
involved in another suit based on the same claim in Pennsylvania, the court withheld
fixing the amount of costs payable to the defendant until the final outcome of that case.
Since both of the suits went to the merits of the case, the court held that not all of the
costs incurred by the defendant as of the date of dismissal would be chargeable against
the plaintiff, but instead, only those expenses that would not have been duplicated in the
preparation of the other action. Id. at 473.
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throughout the pretrial stage of the litigation. Prior to the enactment
of the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure in 1970, the plaintiff was permitted
to dismiss his action at any time before the issues in controversy were
submitted to the jury.48 The current Ohio Rule 41 represents a com-
promise between the prior Ohio Code and Federal Rule 41(a).49 Ohio
Rule 41(A) allows the plaintiff to use the various pretrial discovery meth-
ods to determine the relative merits of his claim and to prepare his case
while still retaining his right to dismiss. In the federal system, however,
the plaintiff's right to dismiss has vanished by the time the parties begin
discovery. Therefore, Ohio Rule 41 is far more liberal in extending the
time for the plaintiff to voluntarily dismiss as of right than is its federal
counterpart.
On the other hand, Ohio Rule 41(A) attempts to protect the de-
fendant from incurring unnecessary expenses by limiting the plaintiff's
right to dismiss to the pretrial stage of the litigation. Ohio Rule 41(A),
by allowing the plaintiff to dismiss his action at any time before the
commencement of trial, extends the right of dismissal as long as pos-
sible without exposing the defendant to extensive and unnecessary costs.
Thus, "commencement of trial" as used in Ohio Rule 41(A) should be
construed with the rights of the parties in mind.
As was stated earlier, there are two basic views regarding when a
trial actually commences.-s The broader view takes into account the
entire trial process. Under this view, the impaneling and the voir dire of
the jury would be considered part of the trial. This was the view taken
by the Ohio Rules Advisory Committee in its initial draft of Rule 41(A).5 1
The second view is that the trial commences immediately after the
jury has been impaneled, upon opening argument by counsel. This is
4 Code of Civil Procedure of the State of Ohio, § 372, 1853 Ohio Laws 57 (codified
at Onso REV. CODE ANN. § 2323.05 (Page 1953) (repealed 1970)) provided: "An action
may be dismissed without prejudice to a future action: (A) by the plaintiff, before its final
submission to the jury, or to the court, when the trial is by the court." See also Lee v.
Jennings Transfer Co., 14 Ohio App. 2d 221, 237 N.E.2d 918 (1967).
There are three essential differences between dismissal by plaintiff under the prior code
and under the current Rule 41:
1) The plaintiff may only dismiss before the commencement of trial, as op-
posed to anytime before final submission to the jury.
2) The plaintiff may now dismiss only once without prejudice, whereas be-
fore there was no limit to the number of times the plaintiff could recommence
his action, providing he was still within the statute of limitations.
3) Rule 41(D) provides that upon the plaintiff's second action on the same
claim, the court may order the payment of the outstanding costs from the pre-
vious action.
1 S. JACOBY, OHIO CIVIL PRACrICE 373-74 (1970).
41 Originally, the Ohio Rules Advisory Committee proposed that Rule 41 be taken ver-
batim from the existing federal rule. The committee felt, however, that this would be too
drastic a change from the existing civil procedure under Ohio Revised Code § 2323.05.
As a compromise, the federal rule was modified to extend the time for the plaintiff
voluntarily to dismiss the case without prejudice until the commencement of trial. Pro-
ceedings of the Ohio Rules Advisory Committee38-43 (Nov. 21, 1968), 233-34 (Nov. 22,
1969) (on file with the Ohio Supreme Court Library).
0 See notes 31-32 and accompanying text, supra.
51 Proceedings of the Ohio Rules Advisory Committee 233-34 (Nov. 22, 1968) (on
file with Ohio Supreme Court Library). See note 82 infra.
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the approach California has taken.5 2  Section 581 of the California
Code, which governs voluntary dismissal by plaintiff, while roughly
similar to Ohio Rule 41 in effect, defines the precise point in time that a
trial will be deemed commenced:
A trial shall be deemed to be actually commenced at the begin-
ning of the opening statement of the plaintiff or his counsel, and
if there shall be no opening statement, then at the time of the
administration of the oath or affirmation to the first witness, or
the introduction of any evidence.53
This view more narrowly construes the concept of trial to mean the
commencement of the trial of facts. The statutory definition of trial
in Ohio as the determination of issues of fact or law would, on its face,
appear to be in keeping with the narrower concept of trial.54 Open-
ing argument, presentation of evidence, examination and cross examina-
tion of witnesses, and closing arguments all tend to prove or disprove
the issues in controversy. All of these components relate directly to
determination of the issues. Therefore, it is clear that these items are
part of the trial. On the other hand, the impaneling and the voir dire of
the jury do not relate directly to the issues being litigated. Therefore,
by a strict reading of the Ohio Revised Code's definition of a trial, this
procedure would not be included as part of the trial, but instead, merely
as one of the preliminary steps leading up to the trial.5"
One of the first decisions of record to address the question of whether
or not the impaneling of the jury was included as part of the trial was
United States v. Curtis.5 6  In Curtis, the federal court held that the
impaneling process was separate from the actual trial. The court was
construing a federal statute that stated that the defendant had a right to
a copy of the indictment at least two days "before the trial." The court
reasoned that the term "trial," as used in the statute, was intended to
mean trial by jury, and therefore, the trial could not have begun until
after the jury had been impaneled and sworn in.57 Curtis was a criminal
case, however, not a civil case. The purpose of the criminal statute in
question was to insure that the defendant had notice of the charges
contained in the indictment. The court held that the prosecution had
52 CAL. CIv. Poc. CODE § 581.1 (West 1976). For a discussion of the California dis-
missal statute prior to the enactment of section 581.1, see 30 CAL. L. REv. 76 (1941).
5 CAL. CIv. PRoc. CODE § 581.1 (West 1976).
' OHo REV. CODE ANN. § 2311.01 (Page 1954).
- In Pfleeger v. Swanson, 229 Ore. 254, 367 P.2d 406 (1961), the court distinguished
between the terms "trial" and "trial of facts." The court held that the voir dire was part
of the trial, but not part of the trial of facts. Id. at 258, 367 P.2d at 408. Under this
rationale, it seems that the OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2311.01 (Page 1954) would more
aptly define the trial of facts. The term "trial," as used in Pfleeger, seems to take into
account not only the determination of the issues in controversy, but also, the entire pro-
cess that is physically conducted before the court. See notes 117-18 and accompanying
text, infra.
1 25 F. Cas. 726 (C.C.D. Mass. 1826) (No. 14,905).
s7 "In short, . . . there can be no legal doubt, that by the term 'trial,' is generally in-
tended, in the law, the actual trial of the prisoner by the jury." Id. at 728.
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met this requirement, and therefore that the defendant's due process
rights had been satisfied. The holding in Curtis, however, should not be
taken as a general statement concerning the commencement of a trial, for
the case turned upon the particular language in the statute it was con-
struing.58 Thus, the holding of the court was limited in its application.
In Palmer v. State,59 the Supreme Court of Ohio rejected the deci-
sion in Curtis and held that the impaneling process was included as
part of the trial. In Palmer, the defendant appealed a conviction of
murder based upon irregularities which had occurred during the voir
dire of jurors. The prosecution moved to dismiss the appeal, con-
tending that the court could only review those errors which occurred
"during the trial." 6  Therefore, relying on Curtis, the prosecution con-
cluded that because the voir dire of the jury took place before the trial,
as opposed to during the trial, the appellate court was without jurisdic-
tion to hear the appeal. The Supreme Court of Ohio rejected this con-
tention, interpreting the wording of the statute to include the impaneling
of the jury as part of the trial.6'
The question of when a trial actually begins in Ohio, or alternatively,
what components of the litigation process are properly included in the
definition of a trial, was one of first impression in Palmer."' The court's
5 Id. at 727. The statute in question stated that the defendant had a right to a copy
of the indictment, as well as a list of witnesses and jurors, at least two days before trial.
Ch. 9, § 29, 1 Stat. 118 (1790). From a reading of that statute, logic would seem to dic-
tate that the impaneling of the jury could not be considered part of the trial. Otherwise,
the state would have been unable to comply with the statute by giving the defendant a
list of juror's names before the trial.
59 42 Ohio St. 596 (1885).
60 In a criminal case at the time of Palmer, the Ohio Supreme Court was limited in its
power to review "[o]nly errors of law, occurring at the trial or appearing in the pleading
or judgment .. " 1883 Ohio Laws 170 (repealed).
61 The statute governing procedure at a trial at the time of the Palmer decision in 1885
stated that, "after the jury is impaneled and sworn, the trial shall proceed in the following
order .... ." (procedural steps omitted). Code of Criminal Procedure of the State of
Ohio, § 151, 1869 Ohio Laws 287. The court in Palmer seized upon the use of the word
"proceed" to arrive at its conclusion. The court reasoned that had the impaneling process
not been intended to be part of the trial, the statute would have used the word "com-
mence" as opposed to "proceed." 42 Ohio St. at 602.
62 The issue had been raised in dictum in Wagner v. State, 42 Ohio St. 537 (1885),
which was decided the same term as Palmer.
"[T]rial," in the sense of this limitation, has reference upon a plea in bar, and does
not extend to a hearing or a motion to quash, or trial upon a plea in abatement; it
commences, at least, when the jury is sworn, and embraces questions as to the
admissibility of evidence, refusals to charge and the charge given, and the like;
and it ends with the rendition of the verdict. Quaere, whether "trial" extends
to matters occurring during the impaneling of the jury.
Id. at 537 (3d paragraph of the syllabus of the court). The defendant in Wagner had
alleged error in the impaneling of the jury. The court found, however, that there was
no error in the impaneling process, thus avoiding the question of whether the impaneling
of the jury was part of the trial. Id. at 541. One could argue, however, that since
the scope of the court's review was limited to those errors that had occurred at the trial,
through its examination of the impaneling process, the court implicitly decided that this
process was part of the trial.
See also State v. Hartnett, 42 Ohio St. 568 (1885), in which the court held that errors
arising from the inpaneling process were subject to review, but based its decision on the
defendant's constitutional right to a trial by an impartial jury, not the fact that the im-
paneling process was part of the trial. Id. at 572.
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holding in Palmer was based upon a construction of the statute that con-
ferred jurisdiction on the appellate court. This statute applied to both
civil and criminal appeals. Although Palmer was a criminal case, its
holding was not so restrictive as to preclude its application in the civil
area. Therefore, on the basis of the court's reasoning in Palmer, a
fairly respectable argument could be made for the proposition that the
impaneling of the jury should be included in the definition of a civil
trial.83
The only civil case in Ohio that directly addressed the question of
whether or not the impaneling of the jury is part of the trial was Bates
v. State.64 The defendant in Bates appealed on the grounds that the
array of prospective jurors had been improperly selected. In dismissing
the appeal, the court held that the drawing of the array was not part of
the trial, and therefore, that the court had no jurisdiction to review the
case.5 The court cited Palmer as authority for the proposition that the
impaneling of the jury was part of the trial, but distinguished between
the drawing and the impaneling of the jury on the basis that the im-
paneling process took place in open court and the proceedings were part
of the trial's record. Any irregularity which occurs during the impaneling
or voir dire of the jury will be grounds for appeal.6 6 The trial record
in Bates, however, did not reflect the manner in which the jurors were
drawn.67
The holding in Palmer that the impaneling of the jury was part of the
trial was recently reiterated in the case of State v. Wright.68 In
Wright, the defendant appealed from a conviction of felonious assault
on the grounds that the trial court erroneously overruled his motion to
discharge the case. The defendant's motion was predicated on the
ground that he had not been brought to trial within the time set out by
63 The holding in Palmer is consistent with subsequent case law. See, e.g., Thomas
v. Mills, 117 Ohio St. 114, 119, 157 N.E. 488, 489 (1927).
61 17 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 193 (C.P. 1914).
6 Id. at 195. The drawing of the array normally will not be subject to appellate re-
view. This is primarily due to the fact that this act does not go directly to the issues
being litigated. "The manner of selecting or drawing jurors concerns the public rather
than the parties in a cause. The statutory provision therefore relates neither to the right
of a party as to the merits nor to the remedy for the vindication of that right .. "
State v. Barlow, 70 Ohio St. 363, 71 N.E. 726 (1904) (syllabus of the court). But see Omo REV.
CODE ANN. § 2313.41 (Page 1954), which gives the parties the right to challenge the whole
array of jurrors if the selection is carried out in a manner other than that prescribed by
law. A challenge to the jury merely on the grounds that the array was improperly drawn,
with no claim of prejudice, will not be sufficient to dismiss the jury. State v. Huling, 17
Ohio St. 583, 588 (1867).
Irregularities that occur during the impaneling of the jury are subject to appellate
review. Although the errors alleged may not be so substantial as to require a new trial,
they are, nonetheless grounds for appeal. See Krupp v. Poor, 24 Ohio St. 2d 123, 265
N.E.2d 268 (1970); Maggio v. City of Cleveland, 151 Ohio St. 136, 84 N.E.2d 912 (1949);
Pearson v. Gardner Cartage Co., 148 Ohio St. 425, 76 N.E.2d 67 (1940); Petro v. Donner,
137 Ohio St. 168, 28 N.E.2d 503 (1940); Durbin v. Humphrey Co., 137 Ohio St. 117, 28
N.E.2d 563 (1940).
67 17 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 193, 200 (C.P. 1914).
61 No. 35040 (Ohio Ct. App., Cuyahoga Cty., filed July 29, 1976).
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statute.' 9 The court of appeals held that where the statute specified
that such a motion to dismiss must be made before commencement of
the trial, the raising of the motion after the impaneling of the jury was
not timely. 70  In deciding that the motion had been made after the
trial had begun, the court stated: "A criminal trial commences when the
parties appear before the court and announce that they are ready to
proceed and thereupon a jury is waived by the defendant or the parties
start to impanel the jury." 71  Although the court in Wright expressly
stated that it was addressing the issue with respect to a criminal trial, as
in Palmer, the underlying rationale is also applicable to a civil trial.
The court in Wright was concerned with the timeliness of a pretrial
motion. Ohio Civil Rule 12(C) states that a pretrial motion should be
made at such time that it will not cause the trial to be delayed.72  On
the day that a case is called for trial, the judge enters the courtroom to
begin the proceedings; counsel for both sides are prepared to proceed
with the trial; prospective jurors are administered an oath or affirmation;
and voir dire begins. If this stage is not considered part of the trial,
preliminary motions could be properly raised. These motions may re-
quire disposal only after written briefs have been submitted to the court
or a hearing has been held on the matter.7 3 The result of such a motion
9 Omio REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.71(C) (Page Supp. 1977) provides that a person
charged with a felony shall be given a preliminary hearing within fifteen days of arrest
and brought to trial within two hundred and seventy days. Pursuant to OMo REV. CODE
ANN. § 2945.73(B) (Page 1975), a motion by the defendant to dismiss the charge on the
ground of a denial of a speedy trial must be made "at or prior to the commencement of
trial."
70 State v. Wright, No. 35040, slip op. at 6 (Ohio Ct. App., Cuyahoga Cty., filed July 29,
1976).
71 Id. at 5.
72 See, e.g., Ot-o R. Civ. P. 12(C), which states: "Motion for judgment on the plead-
ings. After the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to delay the trial, any
party may move for judgment on the pleadings." Omno R. Ctv. P. 12(D) governs the
regulation of preliminary hearings: "The defenses specifically enumerated in (1) to (7) in
subdivision (B) of this rule, whether made in a pleading or by motion, and the motion men-
tioned in subdivision (C) of this rule shall be heard and determined before trial on applica-
tion of any party."
Ohio Rule 12(D) differs from Federal Rule 12(d) in that the latter gives the court the
option of either determining the preliminary motion at a hearing, or deferring the matter
until trial. In Ohio, the court does not have the power to defer the matter until trial. Al-
though Ohio Rule 12(D) states that a hearing will be granted upon application by any
party, this should not be taken to mean that if no application is made, the motion will be
determined at the trial.
When a preliminary motion is made, Ohio Rule 12(A) states that the time for filing a
responsive pleading is altered, since the time for filing is dependent upon whether the
motion is granted or denied. Therefore, the defendant, after filing his motion to dismiss,
need not file his answer until the status of the motion has been determined. Federal
Rule 12(a) contains an additional provision to correspond to the power of the court under
rule 12(d) to defer the matter until trial. In the federal system, once the motion is de-
ferred until trial, the time for filing the answer begins to run again. Ohio Rule 12(A)
does not contain this additional time provision. Therefore, in the Ohio system, when the
motion to dismiss is made, unless an application for determination followed, the litiga-
tion would grind to a halt. To prevent this from occurring, the court in State ex. rel. Keating
v. Pressman, 38 Ohio St. 2d 161, 311 N.E.2d 524 (1974), added a gloss to Ohio Rule 12(D)
by stating that an application for a hearing would be included in a motion to dismiss.
Thus, despite the language in Rule 12(D), a separate application is not necessary.
73 Ohio Rule 7(B) provides that if local rules permit, the court may dispense with
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would be delay in the litigation. At this stage of the process, the delay
will involve more than merely setting the trial date back on the calendar.
This delay will tie up the time of the judge, the jurors, and the attorneys.
The policy behind including the impaneling of the jury as part of the trial
is to reduce, if not eliminate, any unnecessary delay. This policy argu-
ment applies equally to the civil and criminal areas. Therefore, for the
purpose of pretrial motions, the trial should be deemed commenced once
the jury impaneling has begun.
This definition of the commencement of the trial finds support in
the application of Ohio Civil Rule 41(A). Prior to the impaneling pro-
cess the court costs will be relatively low. Most of the costs incurred
up until that point will have been in the nature of filing fees, which will
have already been paid by the parties themselves.74 Once the jury
impaneling begins, however, the addition of jury and courtroom costs
add considerably to the unpaid balance.7 5 If this stage is not considered
part of the trial, the plaintiff could dismiss with impunity, leaving the
court to bear the unallocated costs. 76  Voluntary dismissal under Ohio
Rule 41(A) is not discretionary with the judge, nor may dismissal be
granted conditioned upon the plaintiff's paying these costs.7 7 It is a mat-
ter of absolute right as long as the notice of dismissal is filed before the
trial commences.78  Once the trial has begun the judge may, and usually
will, condition the dismissal upon the plaintiff paying the court costs
oral hearings and decide a motion based on written briefs and affidavits. Omo R. Civ. P.
7(B)(2).
74 Some costs, such as the fees of the sheriff in serving subpoenas and other papers,
are not paid by the parties at the time the act is performed. Instead, these costs will be
taxed against the parties by the court after the final outcome of the litigation. OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 311.17-.18 (Page 1954). The bulk of court costs, however, will gener-
ally be in the form of filing fees, and therefore, already paid by one of the parties.
7' Some examples of the additional costs that would arise after the impaneling pro-
cess has begun are court stenographer fees and jury costs. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§
2301.21, 2313.34 (Page Supp. 1977). There are other costs involved, but these may vary
depending on the local rules of court. To date, there is no uniform, statewide schedule
of the various components of court costs.
71 The plaintiff's escape from payment of these costs may be short-lived. If he recom-
mences the suit at a later date, Rule 41(D) provides that the court may order the pay-
ment of the costs which accrued in the previous action. Omo R. Civ. P. 41(D). See
note 30 supra.
77 "A dismissal by the plaintiff involves no action by the court; it is a voluntary with-
drawal of his case. ... Seigfried v. New York, L. E. & W. R. Co., 50 Ohio St. 294, 297,
34 N.E. 331, 332 (1893).
78 Based, upon the only case to date construing the plaintiff's right to dismiss under
Ohio Rule 41(A)(1), it appears that the rule will be strictly construed in favor of the de-
fendant. Standard Oil Co. v. Grice, 46 Ohio App. 2d 97, 345 N.E.2d 458 (1975). In
Grice, the plaintiff moved for the dismissal of the defendant's counterclaim. Following a
ruling on the plaintiff's motion against the defendant, but prior to the journalization of
this ruling, the defendant filed a notice of the voluntary dismissal of his counterclaim.
The court of appeals, in an opinion by Judge McBride, held that the notice of dismissal
had been timely filed pursuant to Rule 41(A)(1), since it had been filed before the com-
mencement of trial. Id. at 101, 345 N.E.2d at 461. It would seem that the Ohio dismissal
provision, based upon the holding in Grice, favors a strict construction of Rule 41(A).
This is similar to the approach taken by the federal courts, except perhaps in the unusual
situation where the defendant has incurred great expense, but neither an answer nor a mo-
tion for summary judgment has been filed. See note 46 supra.
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that have accrued to date.7 9  Thus, it would seem that the better rule
would be to define the impaneling process as part of the trial, thereby
giving the court the power to assess costs against the plaintiff when, at
that late stage, he is either unable or unwilling to proceed.,,
It seems clear, therefore, that for the purposes of the plaintiff's right
to seek a voluntary dismissal, the trial should be deemed commenced
when the oath or affirmation is administered to the array of prospective
jurors."' This is the definition that the Ohio Rules Advisory Committee
intended when they drafted Ohio Rule 41(A).82 This is also the in-
terpretation that best fits the rule's application in the Ohio system, since
it allows the plaintiff the longest possible time to dismiss his action with-
out adversely affecting the defendant.83 The impaneling process will
usually take two or three days at most. This additional time will not
be of such benefit to the plaintiff that it would outweigh the expense
that would be incurred by the court and the defendant. Therefore, for
the purpose of Ohio Rule 41(A), a trial commences upon the impaneling
of the jury, and a motion to dismiss by the plaintiff after that point in
time will not be granted as a matter of right, but still may be granted in
the sound discretion of the court.
B. Rule 54(C): The Demand for Judgment
Ohio Civil Rule 15 governs the process by which a party may amend
his pleading. 84 The rule sets out specifically that a party may amend
79 The Court has the power to do this pursuant to OHio R. Civ. P. 54(D).
so A codification of this "better rule" may be found within the California dismissal
statute, which states that the trial commences after the jury is impaneled and that the
plaintiff must always pay the costs upon dismissal. CAL. CIv. PRoc. CODE § 581.1 (West
1976). See notes 52-53 and accompanying text, supra. Even when the dismissal is of
right, it is conditioned upon the plaintiff's payment of the court costs. Federal Rule 41
solves this problem by shortening the length of time a plaintiff may dismiss without hav-
ing to go through the court. The Ohio Rule, which extends the plaintiff's right to dismiss
beyond the federal rule, lacks a provision pertaining to the payment of costs. There-
fore, all costs not previously paid by the parties will be borne by the court.
1I There is some language in past Ohio cases from which one could infer support for
this view of the commencement of a trial. Meyer v. Welsbacher, 80 Ohio App. 200, 75
N.E.2d 89 (1947). "It was the trial court's duty, under the statute, to make up the issue
by an order on the journal before the impaneling of the jury, which is to say, before
trial commenced .. " Id. at 203, 75 N.E.2d at 90. See also Cottmon v. Federman Co.,
71 Ohio App. 89, 47 N.E.2d 1009 (1942).
12 Ohio Rule 41(A), as originally drafted, specified that the plaintiff's right to volun-
tarily dismiss the lawsuit without prejudice would terminate upon the impaneling of the
jury. Proceedings of the Ohio Rules Advisory Committee at 40 (Nov. 21, 1968) (on file
with the Ohio Supreme Court Library). When the rule was adopted by the committee in
its final form, however, a change in its language substituted the term "call to trial" for
the original, but more cumbersome, "before the jury is impaneled and sworn in actions
triable to the jury." Id. at 234 (Nov. 22, 1968). Because of the local meanings attached
to the term "call to trial," the Ohio Supreme Court substituted the term "commence-
ment of trial." For a brief discussion of the evolution of Ohio Rule 41(A), see Standard
Oil Co. v. Grice, 46 Ohio App. 2d 97, 100, 345 N.E.2d 458, 460 (1975).
sa See notes 48-49 and accompanying text, supra.
"I O4io R. Civ. P. 15(A)'provides in part:
A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of course at any time before a
responsive pleading is served, or, if the pleading is one to which no responsive
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a pleading as a matter of course before any responsive pleading is
served, or in the event no responsive pleading is permitted, within
twenty-eight days from the date the original pleading was filed. 8
5
Rule 15 also permits the court to grant leave to file amendments at
any other time when justice so requires. 86 While Rule 15 lays out the
general procedure that one must follow in seeking to amend a pleading,
the rule is not exclusive. One exception to this general rule is contained
in Ohio Rule 54(C).87  The amendment provision of Rule 54(C), applies
when a party wishes to increase the amount of money damages con-
tained in the complaint. Rule 54(C) states that a party wishing to amend
the demand for judgment must do so at least seven days before the com-
mencement of the trial. Again, because of the lack of a precise defini-
tion of "commencement of trial," a plaintiff will be unable to determine
with any degree of certainty the point at which he will be foreclosed
from amending the demand for judgment.
It appears that the amendment provision of Rule 54(C) was enacted
to establish a separate procedure for amending the demand for judgment,
distinct from other parts of the complaint. Neither Rule 15 nor Rule
54(C), nor their accompanying staff notes, contain any specific reference
one to the other.
A brief examination of Federal Rule 54(c) will be of some assistance
in tracing the development of Ohio Rule 54(C). Federal Rule 54, is
primarily concerned with the type of judgment rendered in a lawsuit.
In the federal system, Rule 54(c) does not contain any separate amend-
ment provision. As a result, Federal Rule 15 is exclusive in the area of
amendments to the pleadings. Secondly, the federal rule does not limit
the defendant's potential liability to the amount stated in the demand
for judgment as does Ohio Rule 54(C).
As originally proposed by the Ohio Rules Advisory Committee,
pleading is permitted and the action has not been placed upon the trial calendar,
he may so amend it at any time within twenty-eight days after it is served. Other-
wise, a party may amend the pleading only by leave of court or by written con-
sent of the adverse party. Leave of court shall be freely given when justice so
requires.
85 Id.
" Id. Because Rule 15 provides that leave of court shall be freely given, the im-
portance of the timeliness of the filing of an agreement is reduced somewhat. Rule 15(A)
allows a broader scope of discretion to the court with respect to amendment of the plead-
ings after the time limitation than did its predecessor, Code of Civil Procedure of the State
of Ohio, § 137, 1853 Ohio Laws 57 (codified at OHiO REV. CODE ANN. § 2309.58 (Page
1954) (repealed 1970)). Under the old code, amendments to the pleadings after the
statutory limit expired could only be made by leave of court. Rule 15(A) goes one step
further, allowing a party to amend his pleading without leave of court by written stipula-
tion of the adverse party.
7 OHIO R. Civ. P. 54(C) provides in part:
(C) Demand for judgment. A judgment by default shall not be different in kind
from or exceed in amount that prayed for in the demand for judgment. Except
as to a party against whom a judgment is entered by default, every final judgment
shall grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled;
however, a demand for judgment which seeks a judgment for money shall limit the
claimant to the sum claimed in the demand unless he amends his demand not
later than seven days before the commencement of trial.
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Ohio Rule 54(C) was identical to Federal Rule 54(c).8 8  A minority of
that committee, however, expressed concern about leaving the defendant
open to virtually unlimited liability. 9 When the rule was adopted by
the Ohio Supreme Court in its final form, it had been modified to
incorporate the minority view on the limitation of damages.90 Thus, the
primary purpose for imposing a deadline for amending the demand for
judgment was to insert a provision that would govern the maximum
liability of the defendant.9
Ohio Rule 54(C), like Ohio Rule 41(A), represents a compromise
between the Ohio system and the Federal Rules. The compromise gives
the plaintiff the flexibility of increasing the amount of the demand for
judgment up to a week before the trial, but at the same time places a
ceiling on the liability of the defendant. 92 The practical result, however,
has been to create a special exception to the general procedure for
amending the pleadings. Although both Ohio Rule 15 and Ohio Rule
54(C) relate to the amendment of the pleadings, Rule 54(C) is more nar-
row in its scope. Given the situation where the two rules overlap, the
specific will prevail over the general.9
While it is clear which rule applies to the amendment of the demand
for judgment, it is not so clear when such an amendment is timely filed.
m Proceeding of the Ohio Rules Advisory Committee at 285-88 (Nov. 21, 1968) (on
file with the Ohio Supreme Court Library).
s9 Id. at 287.
90 "[U]nder the rule [54(C)], defendant, at least at trial time, would be secure in
the knowledge that he may be liable only to the extent of the amended demand for
judgment." Ohio Rules Advisory Committee Staff Note to OHIO R. Civ. P. 54(C). Under
Federal Rule 54(c), the defendant does not have this security. An illustration of the above
situation is contained in the Staff Note to Ohio Rule 54(C). The attempt to limit the
plaintiff's recovery, or conversely, the defendant's liability, was the primary purpose for
inserting the additional clause limiting the plaintiffs right to amend his demand for judg-
ment.
'I There has been a tendency by the Ohio courts to overlook the special amendment
provision in Rule 54(C), and instead, look only to Rule 15 for guidance in this area.
In Kelchner Excavating v. Zimmerman, 25 Ohio Misc. 133, 264 N.E.2d 918 (C.P.
1970), the plaintiff moved to increase his demand for judgment at the commencement of
the trial. The court allowed the amended pleading, holding that the procedure was governed
by Rule 15. The same result was reached in Jasterbowski v. Michos, 44 Ohio App. 2d
201, 337 N.E.2d 627 (1975). Although neither case states exactly when the amended
demand for judgment was filed, a close reading of the facts implies that it was done
after the seven day time limit. In both cases, the courts erroneously applied Rule 15 to a
situation in which it was clear that the amendments were within the confines of Rule
54(C). See also State ex rel. Dean v. Huddle, 45 Ohio App. 2d 163, 341 N.E.2d 860 (1975),
rev'd. 45 Ohio St. 2d 234, 344 N.E.2d 138 (1975). The court of appeals held that since
the plaintiff failed to demand a specific amount of money damages in his petition for
mandamus, Ohio Rule 54(C) raised a bar to any monetary recovery in that action.
ld. at 172-73, 341 N.E.2d at 867. The Ohio Supreme Court reversed without mention of
Rule 54(C).
12 Under section 2325.12 of the Ohio Revised Code, a plaintiff might still be able to
recover an amount greater than the amount demanded in his final amended demand for
judgment. OIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2325.12 (Page 1954). The validity of this section,
however, after the enactment of the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure, is questionable, being
at least in partial conflict with Ohio Rule 54(C). 1 S. JACOBY, supra note 48, at 409. Even
it section 2325.12 may still be invoked, it is limited to circumstances when the incorrect
demand was the result of a mistake of the pleader.
93 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1.51 (Page Supp. 1977).
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The only limitation contained in Ohio Rule 54(C) is that the amendment
be filed at least seven days before the commencement of the trial.94 Un-
der one interpretation of the term "commencement of trial," the plain-
tiff's seven day period would be measured from the time of the opening
arguments to the jury.9 5 Alternatively, the second interpretation would
advance the seven day period to an earlier point in time in the lawsuit by
including the impaneling process within the definition of the trial.9 6
As with Ohio Rule 41(A), the latter interpretation should be used in con-
junction with Ohio Rule 54(C). That is, that the trial begins upon the
commencement of the impaneling of the jury. A brief comparison be-
tween Ohio Rules 15 and 54(C) will reveal the soundness of this inter-
pretation.
Although Ohio Rule 15 sets out a definite procedure for the filing of
a timely amendment, it also gives the court the discretion to accept an
otherwise untimely amendment. Therefore, technically there is no pre-
cise date on which an amendment must be filed under Rule 15. 7 Ohio
Rule 54(C) does not contain a similar discretionary provision. The
amendment of the demand for judgment must be made by a specific date,
seven days before the commencement of the trial. 8 By including the
impaneling of the jury as part of the trial, an element of definiteness is
supplied, since the trial will commence on the date the case is called to
trial" rather than some indefinite date following the impaneling pro-
cess. This interpretation, therefore, establishes a precise date for the
purpose of determining the final day that the plaintiff may amend his
demand for judgment.
Alternatively, if the impaneling of the jury is not included within
the definition of a trial, a definite deadline for the amendment of the
prayer cannot be established in advance. The day of commencement
will depend upon the amount of time necessary to impanel the jury and
will vary with each case. Thus, if the selection process of the jury is
excluded from the definition of a trial, the plaintiff would not be able to
determine the last day for amending the demand for judgment.
Excluding the impaneling process from the definition of a trial also
leaves the operation of the rules open to abuse by a party not acting in
good faith. This could occur when an amendment to the demand for
judgment was filed less than seven days before the call to trial. If
the impaneling process is part of the trial, then the amendment is not
timely filed, and consequently, void. If, however, the trial commences
after the jury is impaneled, the amendment may or may not be timely
filed. There will be no way of determining the validity of the amendment
94 OHIo R. Civ. P. 54(C). For the text of Rule 54(C), see note 87 supra.
" See note 31 and accompanying text, supra.
'6 See note 32 and accompanying text, supra.
97 OHio R. Civ. P. 15(A). For the text of Rule 15(A), see note 84 supra.
98 OHio R. Civ. P. 54(C).
9 The term "call to trial" refers to the day that the trial is scheduled to begin. That
is, the day of commencement of the proceedings in open court, not the day when the notice of
trial is given. See note 82 supra.
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until the trial actually commences. This interpretation could give rise
to dilatory motions and unnecessary jury challenges during the voir dire
solely for the purpose of stretching out the impaneling process and de-
laying the commencement of the trial. Therefore, if only to eliminate
this potential abuse, the better view would be to include the impaneling
of the jury as part of the trial.
This interpretation of "commencement of trial" is the same as the one
suggested for Ohio Rule 41(A). 100 Thus, another argument, although by
no means conclusive, can be made in favor of including the impaneling
of the jury as part of the trial because of the uniform language. The
same terminology, when used in similar circumstances within the Ohio
Rules of Civil Procedure should, if possible, retain the same meaning.
Although mere uniformity should not be the sole criteria, the fact that
the same definition applies to both rules is an additional benefit that
aids in establishing an easier understanding of the mechanics of the Ohio
Rules of Civil Procedure.
C. Rule 32(A): The Use of Depositions at Trial
If a party wishes to use a deposition as evidence in a trial, Ohio
Rule 32(A) requires that the deposition be filed with the court at least
one day before the day of trial.'0 ' Rule 32(A) further provides, how-
ever, that if the deposition is not timely filed with the court, the deposi-
tion may still be used at trial, upon a showing of good cause for the late
filing.' 0 2  Since any extensions are purely discretionary and dependent
upon a showing of good cause, it is necessary to clarify the use of the
ambigious phrase "the day of trial" as it appears in Ohio Rule 32(A).
Two reasons have been advanced for requiring the pretrial filing of
a deposition intended to be used in court. The primary reason for the
filing requirement is to put the opposition on notice of the possible use
of the deposition at trial. 0 3 The second reason is that the filing re-
quirement gives the court greater control over the conduct of the parties
100 See notes 81-83 and accompanying text, supra.
101 OHIO R. Civ. P. 32(A) provides in part: "(A) Use of Depositions. Every deposition
intended to be presented as evidence must be filed at least one day before the day of trial
or hearing unless for good cause shown the court permits a later filing." Although Ohio
Rule 32(A) applies to both a trial and a hearing, for the purposes of this section, only
the filing requirement with respect to a trial will be considered.
10' Id.
10a "'This provision [the filing requirement] adds certainty to the rule. It puts opposing
parties on notice that the deposition might be used in evidence and compliments Rule 56,
the summary judgment rule, by putting the deposition in the court's hands prior to the
hearing." Ohio Rules Advisory Committee Staff Note to Omo R. Civ. P. 32(A). See also
1 S. JACOBY, supra note 54, at 293. The prior civil code, Code of Civil Procedure of the
State of Ohio, § 356, 1853 Ohio Laws 57 (codified at OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2319.29
(Page 1954) (repealed 1970)), provided that any objection to the use of a deposition at
trial had to be filed before the commencement of the trial. This provision worked in con-
junction with Code of Civil Procedure of the State of Ohio, § 353, 1853 Ohio Laws 57
(codified at OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2319.26 (Page 1954) (repealed 1970)). For the text
of section 353, see note 108 infra. Under Rule 32(B), a party may object to the admis-
sability of a deposition at the trial, thus making the written notice requirement far less
crucial under the rules.
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and the progress of the trial. A deposition may be used in a trial for one
of two purposes: as a substitute for live testimony when the party's own
witness is unavailable to testify in person;10 4 or to impeach the testi-
mony of an opposing witness. 0 5 Regardless of the intended use of the
deposition, an attorney will generally know in advance of the trial that a
particular deposition might be needed during the trial. Thus, the filing
requirement is not unduly burdensome. Moreover, by filing the deposi-
tion, both the court and opposing counsel will be put on notice of its
potential use at trial and will be able to act accordingly. Thus, the filing
requirement of Rule 32(A) is an attempt to shift the emphasis of a trial
away from that of a sporting event and toward an open forum for the
presentation of the issues in controversy.
10 6
The court has the power to allow the use of an untimely filed
deposition at trial in the event the deposition is essential to the case and
a good reason is shown for not having met the filing requirement.
10 7
Generally, good cause can be shown when the need for the deposition
at trial was not foreseeable, as in the case of a witness' intervening death
or incapacity. This late filing provision of Ohio Rule 32(A) represents
a change from the prior code provision which gave the court no discre-
tion to permit the use of a deposition that was not filed with the court at
least one day before trial. 10
8
The discretion given to the court under Rule 32(A) to admit a deposi-
tion filed after the trial begins destroys the strictness of the filing re-
quirement. By comparison, Ohio Rule 54(C) does not contain a provision
giving the court the discretion to suspend the time requirement for
104 OHIO R. Civ. P. 32(A)(3).
'05 OHIO R. Civ. P. 32(A)(1).
06 See Pike & Willis, The New Federal Deposition - Discovery Procedure, 38 COLUM. L.
REv. 1179, 1180 (1938).
10- OHIO R. Cxv. P. 32(A). For the text of Rule 32(A), see note 101 supra.
108 Code of Civil Procedure of the State of Ohio, § 353, 1853 Ohio Laws 57
(codified at OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2319.26 (Page 1954) (repealed 1970)): "Every deposi-
tion intended to be read in evidence on the trial must be filed at least one day before the
day of trial." The primary distinction between the prior code provision and Rule 32(A)
is the power of the court under the latter to admit depositions notwithstanding the late
filing date. The modification in the procedure governing the use of depositions permits
the court to avoid arriving at harsh determinations.
In Nicholas v. Yellow Cab Co., 116 Ohio App. 402, 180 N.E.2d 279 (1962), upon
the defendant's motion, the trial court recessed the trial for a day to permit the de-
fendant to take additional depositions and submit them as evidence. Upon the plaintiff's
objection to this motion the lower court gave the plaintiff the option of either consenting
to the recess or having the court declare a mistrial. The court of appeals affirmed, hold-
ing that the plaintiff had consented to the late filing of the deposition, and therefore, had
waived his right to complain. Id. at 406, 180 N.E.2d at 282. In the absence of such
a choice, however, a deposition could not be filed subsequent to the filing date. Superior
Metal Prod. v. Modern Metal Express, 6 Ohio App. 2d 1, 215 N.E.2d 617 (1966). A
plaintiff caught in this situation under the prior code could avoid hardship by dismissing
the lawsuit pursuant to the liberal dismissal statute. See note 48 sMpra. Thus, the plaintift
did have a remedy of sorts in these instances. The defendant, however, was not in the
same fortunate position, for there was little he could do but continue the trial without the
benefit of the deposition. Ohio Rule 32(A), by permitting the late filing of depositions,
puts the plaintiff and defendant on equal ground as far as relief in this type of situation
is concerned.
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amending the demand for judgment. 1' 9 Since Rule 32(A) is not manda-
tory, the commencement of the trial is not as crucial a stage in the litiga-
tion as it is in the case of the plaintiff's right to amend his demand for
judgment, or his right to voluntarily dismiss the action.110 Consequent-
ly, the determination of the exact point in time when the deposition must
be filed is not as important.
Originally, the primary function of the deposition in a civil action was
to serve as a means of discovery.' In contrast, a deposition in the crimi-
nal area has been used primarily in place of live witnesses, as a form of
direct testimony." 2 Thus, while it is the general rule in a criminal trial
that a deposition will be offered into evidence, in civil cases the use of
the deposition at trial has been more of an exception. This statement
finds support in the fact that Ohio Criminal Rule 15(A), the rule govern-
ing the use of a deposition in a criminal trial, requires no pretrial filing
with the court.113 A recent liberalizing amendment to Civil Rule 32(A)
facilitiates the use of a deposition as a substitute for live testimony at
civil trials." 4 This amendment seems to reflect a retreat from the notion
that the primary role of a deposition in a civil action is for discovery pur-
poses. Ohio Civil Rule 32(A) anticipates the use of depositions in civil
trials equal to that permitted by Ohio Criminal Rule 15(A). Federal Civil
Rule 32(a), upon which the Ohio Rule was patterned, does not contain a
filing requirement similar to the one contained in Ohio Civil Rule
32(A).1 5 The purpose of giving notice to the court and opposing coun-
sel, becomes less crucial as the exceptional use of depositions in civil
trials gradually develops into the general rule. If, in fact, the use of
depositions in civil trials is no longer a rarity, then there is no need to
109 For the text of Rule 54(C), see note 87 supra.
110 For instance, even though the plaintiff may still dismiss his case after the trial has
commenced, a dismissal at that time may not be obtained as of right, but lies within the
discretion of the court. See notes 28-30 and accompanying text, supra.
'" 5 ANDERSON'S OHIO CIVIL PRAcncE § 168.01 (1973).
112 See State v. Villagomez, 44 Ohio App. 2d 209, 212-13, 337 N.E.2d 167, 170 (1974).
113 OHIo R. CraM. P. 15(A).
114 The 1972 amendment to Ohio Rule 32(A) substituted the words "presented as
evidence" for the former "read in evidence." This amendment provides for greater
application of the rule, encompassing electronic recordings and videotape. The admis-
sability of a deposition in lieu of live testimony, however, is still subject to the restrictions
of Rule 32(A)(3). But see Crist v. United States War Shipping Administration, 64 F. Supp.
934 (E.D. Pa. 1946), where the plaintiff introduced depositions and the defendant failed
to timely object. The court held that since the defendant had not objected at the time
of admission, it was presumed that the plaintiff had met one of the five provisions of
admissability enumerated in Federal Rule 32(a)(3 ). Id. at 937-38.
115 FED. R. Civ. P. 32(a). This omission of a filing requirement is due to the fact that
in the federal system no distinction is made between a deposition taken solely for dis-
covery purposes and one to be used as evidence in a trial. A party will be put on notice
of the possible use of the deposition at the trial merely by the notice of the discovery pro-
ceeding itself.
. While the interrogation at the deposition will be broader than at the trial, the deposi-
tion can be edited, based on the objections raised at the deposition. Thus the deposition
can serve effectively both as a discovery device and as evidence at trial. See Stewart v.
Meyers, 353 F.2d 691, 696 (7th Cir. 1965); Independent Prod. Corp. v. Loews, Inc., 30
F.R.D. 377, 381 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); Rosenthal v. Peoples Cab Co., 26 F.R.D. 116, 118
(W.D. Pa. 1960).
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give notice to opposing counsel and one questions the need for impos-
ing a filing requirement. If the filing requirement is to remain part of
Ohio Rule 32(A), however, then the deadline for filing should at least be
extended for as long as possible.
The terminology employed in Ohio Rule 32(A) should be compared to
that contained in Ohio Rules 41(A) and 54(C). Both of the latter rules
use the term "commencement of trial." Rule 32(A), on the other hand,
states that the filing should be at least one day before the "day of trial.
S. .,,116 The question arises whether a different meaning was intended
by the use of different terminology. Stated conversely, if the same
meaning was intended to apply to all three rules, why were different
terms chosen?
In Pfleeger v. Swanson, the Oregon Supreme Court drew a distinction
between the terms "trial" and "trial of facts.""' 7  The court construed
the word "trial" to include all of the procedures conducted while the
parties were physically before the court whereas "trial of facts" included
only those stages of the proceedings that went directly to the determina-
tion of the issues in controversy." 8 A trial was held to encompass the
trial of facts, but was not limited to the trial of facts. Thus, in Pfleeger,
the use of two similar but not identical terms gave rise to two separate
meanings.
The situation presented in Pfleeger is analogous to the situation that
has resulted from the use of the terms "commencement of trial," in
Rules 41(A) and 54(C), and "day of trial" in Rule 32(A). The two terms,
while only slightly variant, take on different meanings. The better inter-
pretation would appear to be to construe the language in Rule 32(A) to
mean that the filing of the deposition must be made before the trial of
facts, as that term was defined in Pfleeger. According to this defini-
tion the deposition would have to be filed before the opening argument
of counsel, or in its absence, before presentation of the first evidence.
The distinction being that commencement of trial, as used in Ohio
Rules 41(A) and 54(C), means the commencement of the trial process,
which begins at an earlier stage than the trial of facts. The liberal lan-
guage of Rule 32(A) supports this conclusion by providing for later fil-
ing.
Unlike Ohio Rules 41(A) and 54(C), a late filing under Rule 32(A)
will not substantially impair the rights of the opposing party. As a rule,
both parties will be represented at the taking of a deposition" 19 and
will have a transcript of the testimony before the trial. Thus the filing of
the deposition with the court will not be essential to the opposing coun-
sel's preparation for trial. Requiring that the filing deadline be at an
earlier stage in the trial process will only serve to exclude otherwise
proper evidence. 120
1,OHIO R. Civ. P. 32(A).
11 229 Ore. 254, 367 P.2d 406 (1961).
ns Id. at 258, 367 P.2d at 408.
11 OHIO R. Civ. P. 30(B).
120 Testimonial statements not subject to an opportunity for cross examination will be
19r76]
25Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1976
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
Ohio Rule 32(A)(3) states, in effect, that when a witness is dead or
unavailable, his deposition will serve as an adequate substitute.' 2' In
such a situation, it would be an injustice to prevent the use of the de-
position at the trial merely because the party failed to timely file the
deposition. If the witness is merely unavailable temporarily, and the
choice is either to admit the untimely filed deposition or to grant a con-
tinuance or dismissal .without prejudice, the latter options would only
result in wasted time for both the court and the parties. When the testi-
mony would be almost identical in content, whether live or by deposi-
tion, there seems no reason to delay the trial once it has begun.
The better interpretation of the term "day of trial," as used in Ohio
Rule 32(A) would be to permit a party to file his deposition with the
court at any time up to one day before the opening statement. This inter-
pretation will allow the court the ability to regulate the proceedings and
to give the opposing party notice of the possible use of the deposition
at the trial, but it will not do so at the expense of excluding otherwise
valid evidence from the consideration of the jury. While the terms are
similar they need not imply identical meanings. This minor distinction
in terminology, when coupled with the differing purposes of the rules
sustains the contention that the time limitation imposed by Rule 32(A)
should not be the same as that imposed by Ohio Civil Rules 41(A) and
54(C). Moreover, the distinction may be maintained without impairing
the desirable uniformity established thus far in the Ohio Rules of Civil
Procedure.
excluded by the hearsay rule. A deposition does offer the opposing side the opportunity
to cross-examine, hence, the requirement of the hearsay rule is satisfied. See 5 WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAw, § 1370 (Chadbourn rev. 1974). OHIO R. CIv. P.
30(C) states that the opposing party has the same right to cross examine at a deposition
as he does at a trial. Therefore, when a deposition is offered into evidence, the opposing
party has had the opportunity to cross-examine the witness and the hearsay requirement
has been met. FED. R. Evw. 804(B)(1) allows the admission of depositions into evidence
at trial as an exception to the hearsay rule as long as both the oath and an opportunity for
cross-examination were present at the taking of the deposition. But see Derewecki v.
Pennsylvania R.R. 353 F.2d 436, 443 (3d Cir. 1965). It must be remembered, however,
that "A deposition is a substitute, or second best, not to be used when the original is at
hand, for it deprives of the advantage of having the witness before the jury." Arnstein v.
Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 470 (2d Cir. 1946) (quoting Napier v. Bossard, 102 F.2d 467, 468-69
(2d Cir. 1939)). For the most part, the deposition of a witness as a substitute for live
testimony, will only be admissable when the witness is dead or unavailable.
121 In some situations a party may be given the option of using a live witness or his
deposition at the trial. Ohio Rule 32(A)(3)(b) permits a deposition to be used instead of a
live witness when the witness is outside the subpoena power of the court and his absence
was not procured by the party attempting to use the deposition. Where the witness is
willing to come into court at the request of one party, but reluctant to do so for the other,
an attorney finds himself in the favorable position of being able to choose the method by
which he will put the witness' testimony before the jury. The situations where an -at-
torney will have such an option, however, are rare. See Omo REV. CoDE ANN. § 4123.519
(Page 1973), which permits the use of the deposition of a physician in lieu of live testi-
mony in an appeal from a decision of the industrial commission, even when the physician
is within the jurisdiction of the court.
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III. THE MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL
A motion for a new trial is a petition directed to the trial court by
the losing party requesting a retrial of the issues in controversy.
2
The motion for a new trial is governed by Rule 59 of the Ohio Rules of
Civil Procedure.'23 The basis for this motion is that the court erred
during the course of the previous trial, and that the error worked to the
prejudice of the moving party. Ohio Rule 59(A) lists nine grounds upon
which the movant may base his motion for a new trial. In addition to
the grounds enumerated, Ohio Rule 59 also gives the court the power to
set aside a jury verdict when, in the sound discretion of the court, good
cause has been shown. 12 4  Rule 59 reflects the merger of the common
law motion for a new trial and the equitable petition for rehearing. 125
At common law the judge had the power to grant a new trial in an ac-
tion before a jury.' 28 Rule 59 has extended this power to non-jury
actions. The rule further provides that in some situations the court may
'2 OHio R. Cirv. P. 59(A) provides in part:
A new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the
issues upon any of the following grounds:
In addition to the above grounds, a new trial may also be granted in the sound
discretion of the court for good cause shown.
When a new trial is granted, the court shall specify in writing the grounds up-
on which such new trial is granted.
On a motion for a new trial in an action tried without a jury, the court may
open the judgment if one has been entered, take additional testimony, amend
findings of fact and conclusions of law or make new findings and conclusions,
and enter a new judgment.
123 Id.
124 Id. This provision seems to take into account any possible error not elsewhere
specified in the other nine grounds. Prior to the enactment of the Ohio Rules of Civil
Procedure, the trial court possessed in inherent power to grant a new trial even when the
grounds were not specifically enumerated in the Code. Code of Civil Procedure of the
State of Ohio, § 297, 1853 Ohio Laws 57, amended by Act of July 10, 1945, § 1, 1945 Ohio
Laws 366 (codified at Omo REv. CoDE ANN. § 2321.17 (Page 1954) (repealed 1970)). See
Grosser v. Armet Alloys, Inc., 70 Ohio L. Abs. 161, 113 N.E.2d 391 (Ct. App. 1953);
Maimone v. Maimone, 55 Ohio L. Abs. 566, 90 N.E.2d 383 (Ct. App. 1949); Sherer v.
Smith, 85 Ohio App. 317, 88 N.E.2d 426 (1949).
125 The Advisory Committee note accompanying Federal Rule 59 refers to this rule as
an amalgamation of the petition for rehearing in equity and the motion for a new trial.
Federal Advisory Committee Staff Note to FED. R. Civ. P. 59. This is in keeping with the
structure of the Civil Rules, consolidating actions at law and equity into one civil action.
126 While the jury renders the verdict, it does not become an enforceable judgment
until the court makes the journal entry. Thus, if the judge is not satisfied with the
verdict, he has the duty to set it aside and try the matter again. In Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.
v. Yeats, 122 F.2d 350 (4th Cir. 1941), the court discussed the relationship between the
power of the jury to render a verdict and the power of the court to grant a new trial:
On such a motion it is the duty of the judge to set aside the verdict and grant a
new trial, if he is of the opinion that the verdict is against the clear weight of the
evidence, or is based upon evidence which is false, or will result in a miscar-
riage of justice, even though there may be substantial evidence which would pre-
vent the direction of a verdict. The exercise of this power is not in derogation
of the right of trial by jury, but is one of the historic safeguards of that right.
Id. at 352-53. For a discussion of the historical evolution of the power of the court to
grant new trials, see Sunray Oil Corp. v. Allbritton, 187 F.2d 475, 477-79 (5th Cir. 1951)
(dissenting opinion). See generally Riddel, New Trial at Common Law, 26 YALE L. J.
49 (1916).
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open the judgment and take additional testimony and other evidence. 127
A motion for a new trial is not an appeal, for jurisdiction remains
lodged with the trial court at all times. It is an opportunity for the trial
court to review the rulings that it made during the past trial, and with the
aid of hindsight, to determine for itself whether any reversible errors
were made. While the motion is usually made by the losing party, the
rule states that a new trial may be granted to any of the parties in the
lawsuit. 28 Ohio Rule 59(D) also permits the court upon its own initia-
tive to order a new trial.129 Thus the trial court may correct its own
errors, as opposed to being reversed in a subsequent appeal. 130 Because
the motion is heard by the same court, the record is readily available and
the judge is familiar with the case. Therefore, review by the trial court
will be far more expeditious than by the appellate court.
Although a motion for a new trial is not an appeal, it does not preclude
the party making such a motion from subsequently appealing the case
in the event a new trial is not granted. The appeal may be based upon
the trial court's denial of the motion for a new trial,' 31 or on the original
127 OHIo R. Civ. P. 59(A). Patterson v. National Life & Accident Ins. Co., 183 F.2d 745,
747-48 (6th Cir. 1950).
125 The rule provides, for instance, that a party may make a motion for a new trial on
the grounds of inadequacy of damages. Otno R. Civ. P. 59(A)(4). For one way in which
this ground could be used, see note 234 infra.
129 OHio R. Civ. P. 59(D). The court, in making this order, is bound by the same limi-
tation as the parties to do so within fourteen days of entry of judgment. An exception
to this rule is the power of the court to order a new trial from the appellant's motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict pursuant to Rule 50(B). In Ruse v. Ruddy, 30
Ohio App. 2d 171, 283 N.E.2d 818 (1972), noted in 21 U. KAN. L. REv. 221 (1973), the
court held that a timely filed motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict by the
losing party will provide the basis for the court's ordering a new trial, even when the order
is granted beyond the fourteen day time limit and there has been no separate motion.
The basis of this exception is that the greater relief (judgment notwithstanding the ver-
dict) incorporates the lesser relief (new trial).
In the federal system, Rule 50(b) is not read so broadly as to incorporate a motion
for a new trial. In Jackson v. Wilson Trucking Corp., 243 F.2d 212 (D.C. Cir. 1957) the
court held that the two motions were separate, and reversed the order of the trial court
granting the new trial. Judge Burger (now Chief Justice Burger) strongly dissented.
Judge Burger argued that the court was valuing form over substance by taking such a
rigid interpretation of Rule 50(b).
The problem arises when an appellant files a motion for judgment not withstanding
the verdict after receiving an adverse verdict, and the errors alleged are strong enough
to support an order for a new trial, but not an entry of judgment notwithstanding the
verdict. Under the federal view, the court would be forced to deny the motion and af-
firm the judgment for the prevailing party, even when it is clear that a new trial should be
ordered. In the Ohio system, the trial court may deny the motion for judgment notwith-
standing the verdict and order a new trial where it deems necessary. For one possible ap-
plication of the Ruse decision, see note 160 infra.
130 One of the points stressed by Judge Burger in his dissent in Jackson was that
when the alleged error would merit a new trial at the trial court level, it will also merit one
at the appellate court level. Consequently, the movant will still be able to get his new trial,
but will have to take an extra step to do so by going through the court of appeals. 243
F.2d at 221 (Burger, J., dissenting).
131 Jolley v. Martin Bros. Box Co., 158 Ohio St. 416, 109 N.E.2d 652 (1952); McAtee
v. W. & S. Life Ins. Co., 82 Ohio App. 131, 181 N.E.2d 225 (1948). Conversely an order
granting a new trial is a final order, from which an appeal will immediately lie. OHIo
REV. CODE ANN. § 2505.02 (Page 1954). For the language of section 2505.02, see note 21
supra. See also Price v. McCoy Sales & Serv. Inc., 2 Ohio St. 2d 131, 207 N.E.2d 236
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judgment of the court. 13 2  Only one appeal per final order is permitted,
however, and any errors not raised in that appeal are thereby lost. 3 3
The effect of a motion for a new trial, then, is to give the losing party
two chances for review of the merits: once at the trial level and again at
the appellate level.
In the Ohio System, Appellate Rule 4(A) states that an appeal must
be filed within thirty days of the entry of judgment.13 4  Of the array
of post trial motions an attorney has at his disposal, only two of them, the
motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59 and the motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict pursuant to Rule 50(B), will suspend the time
for filing a notice of appeal. 13  Absent this feature of suspension, a
party would be forced to choose between seeking relief at the trial level
or in the appellate court. Given the crowded dockets facing the trial
courts, it would be a rare occasion when a motion for a new trial could
be made, argued, and decided within the thirty day time limit for filing
notice of appeal. On the other hand, upon the filing of a notice of ap-
(1965), overruling Green Acacia Mutual Life Ins. Co., 156 Ohio St. 1, 100 N.E.2d 211
(1951).
1"' The journalization of the judgment of the court satisfies the first test for finality.
OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2505.02 (Page 1954). There is no requirement that a party seek
a new trial at the trial court level before filing a notice of appeal. OF-o REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2321.01 (Page 1954). See also Kartorie v. San-Nor Oil, 119 Ohio App. 507, 200 N.E.2d
691 (1963).
133 Once the appellate court has reviewed the order being appealed, the doctrine of the
law of the case will apply. This does not, however, preclude multiple appeals in one case,
but merely on the same final order. Thus in Jolley v. Martin Bros. Box Co., 158 Ohio St.
416, 109 N.E.2d 652 (1952), the court held that a party could file a motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict, and later, a motion for a new trial. The overruling of both
these motions may be reviewed in separate appellate proceedings. On the second appeal,
however, the court could only examine those matters that were not determined in the
first review. While the practice of dual appeals is possible under the Ohio Rules of Civil
Procedure, such practice is nonetheless infrequent, for courts are generally reluctant to
entertain unnecessarily fragmented appeals. Whitaker-Merrell Co. v. Geubel Constr. Co.,
29 Ohio St. 2d 184, 187, 280 N.E.2d 922, 924-25 (1972). See also Linz v. Linz, 33 Ohio
App. 2d 174, 293 N.E.2d 100 (1972).
134 Ouio R. App. P. 4(A) states in part:
In a civil case the notice of appeal required by [Appellate] Rule 3 shall be filed
with the clerk of the trial court within 30 days of the date of entry of the judgment
or order appealed from ...
The running of the time for filing a notice of appeal is suspended as to all
parties by a timely motion filed in the trial court by any party pursuant to the
Civil Rules hereafter enumerated in this sentence, and the full time for appeal
fixed by this subdivision commences to run and is to be computed from the entry
of the last of any of the following orders made upon a motion under such rules
granting or denying a motion (1) for judgment under Rule 50(B); (2) for a new
trial under Rule 59. A judgment or order is entered within the meaning of this
subdivision when it is filed with the clerk of the trial court for journalization.
135 Id. Osio R. App. P. 14 (B) expressly states that "the court [of appeals] may not
enlarge or reduce the time for filing a notice of appeal." Prior to the enactment of the
Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure, the Ohio Revised Code provided for an extension of twenty
days to be given by the trial court in the case of death or insanity. Otno REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2505.07 (Page 1954) (This section has been superseded by Appellate Rule 14(B) where
that rule is applicable). The Ohio Civil Rules do not contain a similar provision, imply-
ing that the trial court does not have the power to extend the filing date. But see Boscoe
v. City of Euclid, 38 Ohio App. 2d 40, 311 N.E.2d 870 (1974), where the court implied
that this exception might be carried over from the prior code section. Id. at 42 n.5, 311
N.E.2d at 872 n.5.
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peal, the trial court losses its jurisdiction over the case, and any pending
motion for a new trial is reduced to a nullity. 13  Therefore, as the thirty
day deadline for filing an appeal approached, the party would have to
elect between his motion for a new trial, or a notice of appeal. Because
of the suspension provision in Appellate Rule 4(A), however, the motion
for a new trial and the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict
are more attractive than their common law counterparts, the motions for
rehearing and for reconsideration. 137
It is important to determine after what proceedings a Rule 59 motion
for a new trial will be appropriate. At first glance the answer would
appear to be only after a trial. A trial, however, is defined as the judicial
examination of issues of law or fact. According to this definition, every
judicial proceeding involving the examination of at least one issue can
be properly classified as a trial. This would mean that a motion for a
new trial could apply to almost all judicial proceedings. The language
of the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure seems to indicate that this was
not the intention of the members of the Ohio Rules Advisory Committee.
Rather, it appears that a trial was intended to be defined and treated
as something separate from a hearing. 138  This intention, however,
has in some cases been defeated by the manipulation of the term "trial"
to encompass a hearing, and as a result, the motion for a new trial has
been made applicable to a hearing. 139
It is not clear whether a final order in a hearing should be treated
differently than a final order in a trial. If there are adequate reasons
to support a difference between the two types of judgments, then a
trial should be sufficiently defined to maintain this difference. If, on the
other hand, there is no distinction between the two types of final orders,
then a change should be made in the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure
rather than allowing the language of the rules to be manipulated to
achieve the desired result. The statutory definition of a trial is not ade-
quate to solve the problems that arise from the application of a motion
for a new trial. Therefore, some modifications in this definition should
be made. This section will attempt to develop a workable definition of
the word "trial" with respect to the Rule 59 motion for a new trial.
A. The Motions for Rehearing and Reconsideration:
The Ghosts of the Common Law
There has been much confusion in the Ohio courts with respect to
the common law motions for rehearing and reconsideration. They have
136 Majnaric v. Majnaric, 46 Ohio App. 2d 157, 347 N.E.2d 552 (1975). In that case,
the appellant filed both a motion to vacate and a notice of appeal with the trial court. The
appellate court held that the lower court could not pass on the motion to vacate while
the appeal was pending, for the trial court had been divested of its jurisdiction in the
matter by the filing of the notice of appeal. Id. at 159-60, 347 N.E.2d at 554. See also
Vavrina v. Greczanik, 40 Ohio App. 2d 129, 318 N.E.2d 408 (1974).
137 For a discussion of these common law motions, see notes 140-60 and accompanying
text, infra.
13S See Notes 229-34 and accompanying text, infra.
139 See, e.g., the discussion of Heller v. Heller, No. 34381 (Ohio Ct. App., Cuyahoga
Cty., filed Feb. 4, 1976), at notes 191-97 and accompanying text, infra.
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been confused with a motion for a new trial 40 as well as with each
other.14 ' This is primarily due to the fact that they are common law
motions with no express recognition by either the Ohio Revised Code or
the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure, and as a result they have not been
clearly defined.
A motion for rehearing and motion for reconsideration are not inter-
changeable terms, although they have been used as such in the past due
to a lack of understanding. As it has developed, a motion for rehear-
ing is comparable to a motion for a new trial. Both ask the trial court
for a second opportunity to determine the issues in the litigation.
142
On the other hand, a motion for reconsideration may be roughly analo-
gized to a Rule 50(B) motion for judgment notwithstanding the ver-
dict. 14 The common element between a motion for reconsideration and
a motion for judgment n.o.v. is that they both request the court to enter
a judgment opposite that of the verdict. Therefore, while a motion for a
new trial and a motion for rehearing petition the court for an opportunity
to re-present the evidence, a motion for judgment n.o.v. and a motion for
reconsideration ask the court for a re-evaluation of the evidence pre-
viously presented. The definitions of the common law motions, how-
ever, are not absolute, for a motion for reconsideration has also been
held to be the equivalent of a Rule 60(B) motion for relief from judg-
ment.144
A motion for a new trial is defined by Ohio Rule 59. In contrast, a
motion for rehearing has been characterized as merely an informal local
practice. 45  A motion for a new trial is limited in its application and
will only be available when Rule 59 so provides. 46 On the other hand,
a motion for rehearing is not limited, and will have broader applicabil-
140 North Royalton Educ. Ass'n v. North Royalton Bd. of Educ., 41 Ohio App. 2d 209,
325 N.E.2d 901 (1974); Commack v. Holderman, 37 Ohio App. 2d 79, 307 N.E.2d 38
(1973); Sarchet v. Bunn, 81 Ohio L. Abs. 124, 161 N.E.2d 57 (Ct. App. 1957). The dif-
ference between the two terms has also occurred in the federal system. See Slater v.
Peyser, 200 F.2d 360 (D.C. Cir. 1952); Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Coe, 136 F.2d 771 (D.C.
Cir. 1943); Garden City Feeder v. C.I.R., 75 F.2d 804 (8th Cir. 1935); Penn Sportservice,
Inc. v. Goldstein, 35 F. Supp. 706 (W.D. Pa. 1940).
141 LaBarbera v. Batsch, 117 Ohio App. 273, 182 N.E.2d 632 (1962); United Fireworks
Mfg. Co. v. Tichenor, 113 Ohio App. 470, 178 N.E.2d 626 (1960). The confusion of the
two terms is inferred from their interchangeable use throughout the opinions.
142 In LaBarbera v. Batsch, 117 Ohio App. 273, 182 N.E.2d 632 (1962), the court
construed a motion for rehearing as a motion for a new trial. The court held that where the
common law motion for rehearing was in substance a motion for a new trial the time for
appeal will be suspended. Id. at 276, 182 N.E.2d at 634-35. See notes 154-57 and ac-
and accompanying text.
' See Omo R. Civ. P. 50(B).
44 Kauder v. Kauder, 38 Ohio St. 2d 265, 313 N.E.2d 797 (1974); Taray v. Sadoff, 71
Ohio Op. 2d 203, 331 N.E.2d 448 (Ct. App. 1974). See also Browne, The Fatal Pause -
Summary Judgment and the Motion for Reconsideration, 44 CLEv. BAR J. (1972); Metzer,
Kauder v. Kauder: Strict Interpretation of Appellate Rule 4(A) and the Requirements for
Suspending the Time for Filing a Notice of an Appeal, 2 OHio N. L. REV. 387 (1975).
145 Kauder v. Kauder, 38 Ohio St. 2d 265, 267, 313 N.E.2d 797, 798 (1974); LaBar-
bera v. Batsch, 117 Ohio App. 273, 276, 182 N.E.2d 632, 634-35 (1962).
148 Rule 59 lists nine grounds upon which a party may base a motion for a new trial.
OHIo R. Civ. P. 59(A). In addition the rule provides that a new trial may be granted for
good cause shown.
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ity. i47 A motion for a new trial implies that there has already been a trial
and that the moving party is asking that the judgment be set aside and
the trial process repeated. Based upon that assumption, a motion for a
new trial will only properly lie when a trial has been conducted and has
resulted in a final order.
A motion for rehearing applies to all orders, whether final or inter-
locutory in nature, regardless of whether the prior proceeding was a
hearing or a trial. Therefore, in the case of a final order that was ren-
dered in a trial, a motion for a new trial and a motion for rehearing would
be equally applicable. The motion for new trial, however, has an ad-
vantage over its common law counterpart, for only the Rule 59 motion
for new trial will suspend the time for filing a notice of appeal. It can be
argued that in a case in which a Rule 59 motion is appropriate, a motion
for rehearing would not lie. This is based on the theory that the codi-
fication of the principles of trial practice and procedure in the Ohio
Rules of Civil Procedure preempts the use of any similar common law
motions.' 48 Notwithstanding this argument, there is no reason why an
attorney should file a motion for rehearing and jeopardize his right of
appeal when a motion for a new trial is available to him. In light of the
devastating consequences that would follow, a motion for rehearing in
that situation would always be improper. Therefore, only in limited
cases, such as the granting of an interlocutory decree 49 or a final order
from a hearing,'50 will the motion for rehearing be of current utility to
the practitioner.
Similarly, a motion for reconsideration and a Rule 50(B) motion for
judgment n.o.v. will be equally applicable in many instances. More-
over, both motions request the same relief.'51 A motion for rehearing
will lie after a jury trial or after a matter tried to a court. The Rule
50(B) motion for judgment n.o.v., however, is limited in its applicability
to jury trials., 2 Although the motion for reconsideration will be appli-
cable in more cases, it also has the same limitation as the common law
147 This distinction in applicability also holds true between a motion for judgment not-
withstanding the verdict defined by Rule 50(B) and the common law motion for reconsid-
eration.
148 When the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure were enacted in 1970, any code section
superseded by the rules was repealed. Law of June 5, 1970, § 3, 1969-70 Ohio Laws
3017. Like the former code sections which governed civil procedure, any common law form
of procedure that overlaps the territory of one of the civil rules should also be deemed
superseded. Further, Rule I(C) states that the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure are not ap-
plicable when specific procedures are provided by the Revised Code. The motions for
rehearing and reconsideration, however, are not set out in the Ohio Revised Code. Hence,
they do not fall within the exception contained in Rule 1(C). OHIo R. Civ. P. I(C).
'4' See LaBarbera v. Batsch, 117 Ohio App. 273, 282 N.E.2d 632 (1962).
I" See Morris v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 15 Ohio St. 2d 184, 239 N.E.2d 94
(1968).
,51 As with the case of a motion for rehearing, a motion for reconsideration is not equiva-
lent to a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. When a motion for reconsid-
eration is made on the same grounds that would support a motion for judgment n.o.v.,
however, and within the same time limitation and directed against the same type of final
order, the caption of the motion will be disregarded and the court will treat the motion as
if it had been made pursuant to Ohio Rule 50(B).
152 OHIO R. Civ. P. 50(B).
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motion for rehearing; it does not suspend the time for filing the notice of
appeal. The motion for reconsideration, therefore, will only be of value
in those instances when a motion for judgment notwithstanding the ver-
dict is not available. 153
A problem arises when, following a final order from a trial, a party
only files a motion for rehearing. This problem confronted the court in
LaBarbera v. Batsch.154  The losing party filed a motion for rehearing
with the trial court seven days after the filing of the judgment entry.
Three weeks later the motion for rehearing was denied. Two weeks af-
ter the denial of his motion the plaintiff filed his notice of appeal. The
court of appeals denied the defendant's motion to dismiss, holding that the
notice of appeal was timely filed. In doing so, however, the court did
not hold that the motion for rehearing suspended the time limitation
imposed upon an appellant filing a notice of appeal.155  Instead, the
court treated the motion for rehearing in LaBarbera as a motion for a
new trial since it was based upon one of the grounds enumerated in
the Ohio Revised Code.' In addition, the appellate court pointed out
that had the motion been designated a motion for a new trial, it would
have been handled in the same manner. Thus, the court concluded that
the caption of the motion should not prevail over its substance. It is im-
portant to note, however, that it was a motion for a new trial, not a mo-
tion for rehearing, that suspended the time for appeal. 157
The holding that a motion for rehearing will be taken as a motion
for a new trial in those situations in which Ohio Rule 59 would apply was
reinforced in North Royalton Education Association v. North Royalton
Board of Education. 58  In that case, as in LaBarbera, the court stated
'53 Although technically, a motiori for judgment notwithstanding the verdict may not
be used in a case tried to the court without a jury, the same result may be achieved by a
Rule 59(A) motion for a new trial. This provision allows the court to open the judgment,
take additional testimony, and enter a new judgment. Thus it accomplishes the same
purpose as a motion for judgment n.o.v. in a jury trial. The added provision in Rule 59(A)
further limits the practical utility of a motion for reconsideration.
If this provision in Rule 59(A) were not available, a resourceful party trying a case
to the court could still accomplish the same result, although in a less direct manner, by
submitting a motion for a new trial coupled with a motion for reconsideration. This would
have the same effect as a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The motion
for a new trial would suspend the time for appeal while the motion for reconsideration
would request the court to enter judgment in the opposite way. This situation is dis-
cussed in North Royalton Educ. Ass'n v. North Royalton Bd. of Educ., 41 Ohio App. 2d
209, 252, 325 N.E.2d 901, 908 (1974) (Krenzler, J. concurring).
'-4 117 Ohio App. 273, 182 N.E.2d 632 (1962).
155 Id. at 276, 182 N.E.2d at 634.
I, Code of Civil Procedure of the State of Ohio, § 297, 1853 Ohio Laws 57, amended
by Act of July 10, 1945, § 1, 1945 Ohio Laws 366 (codified at OHIo REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2321.17 (Page 1954) (repealed 1970)) the grounds enumerated in section 2321.17 were
substantially the same as those now contained in OHio R. Civ. P. 59(A).
157 It is doubtful that the ultimate holding of the court was correct. In LaBarbera,
the defendant filed a preliminary motion to dismiss the action. The order was granted
and the plaintiff filed his motion for reconsideration. While the motion for reconsideration
(which should be rehearing) was similar to a motion for a new trial with respect to the
grounds of the motion, a motion for a new trial itself was not applicable to the situation, for
there had been no previous trial. Therefore, there could not have been a new trial.
1' 41 Ohio App. 2d 209, 325 N.E.2d 901 (1974).
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that it would look to the substance of motion to determine whether it
was capable of suspending the thirty day deadline for filing a notice of
appeal.1 59 This misuse of motions presents the court with something
of a Hobson's choice. On the one hand, the court is faced with the
choice of defeating a meritorious claim merely because the attorney
placed the wrong label on the motion. On the other hand, by allowing
the common law motion in a situation that is covered by the rules of
procedure, the court encourages, or at least condones, noncompliance with
the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure. Additionally, such a practice forces
the appellate court to evaluate separately each motion for rehearing
to determine its proper character.'6 ° Thus, regardless of which option
the court selects, the consequences are undesirable.
A motion for a new trial is only available when the two requisite ele-
ments are present: a previous trial that resulted in a final order.
1 6
'
If either one or both of these requirements have not been met, the mo-
tion will be in substance a motion for rehearing. The key in determin-
ing the substance of the motion, therefore, lies in the character of the
previous action to which the motion was applied. If the prior proceed-
ing was a trial resulting in a final order, then the motion will be for a
new trial. If the previous action was not a trial, whether resulting in
either a final or an interlocutory order, only a motion for rehearing will
apply. The question then, is to determine which judicial proceedings
constitute a trial and which do not.
Because Appellate Rule 4(A) was meant to be restrictive in its appli-
cation, a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59 should be strictly
construed. A policy of strict construction, however, will be defeated by
the overly broad definition of a trial provided in section 2311.01 of the
Ohio Revised Code. Therefore, a more refined definition of the word
"trial" is needed to determine the availability of a motion for a new trial
as opposed to a motion for rehearing. Thus, for purposes of Ohio Rule
' Id. at 211-12, 325 N.E.2d at 904.
160 While a party should be given the benefit of the doubt with respect to the substance
of his post-judgment motion, this benefit may be subject to abuse. The following example
illustrates one problem that could arise under the "substance over form" rule. After the
entry of judgment in a jury trial, the losing party files a motion for reconsideration with
the trial court. In most cases, this motion could be taken as a motion for judgment not-
withstanding the verdict. See note 151 supra. Under the doctrine of Ruse v. Ruddy, 30
Ohio App. 2d 171, 283 N.E.2d 818 (1972), the court could enter an order for a new trial
from the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. See note 129 supra. As a
result, a party has the ability to make all three motions in one, leaving the court to dis-
regard the caption to determine what relief the movant was seeking. In light of Judge
Krenzler's warning in North Royalton Educ. Ass'n v. North Royalton Bd. of Educ., 41
Ohio App. 2d 209, 252, 325 N.E.2d 901, 909 (1974), however, this may not be a good
practice to follow. Moreover, there is nso guarantee that the motion for reconsideration
would not be taken as something other than a motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict, such as a Rule 60(B) motion for relief from judgment. See note 144 and accom-
panying text, supra.
161 Technically, these two elements may be combined into one, for a trial was defined
previously to include a final order as one of its essential elements. Note 20 and accom-
panying text, supra. The purpose of the repetition in this case is to distinguish a com-
pleted trial from a mistrial, for under a liberal reading of the statutory definition of a trial,
a party might attempt to argue the applicability of a motion for a new trial to a mistrial.
See note 22 and accompanying text, supra.
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59, a trial should not envelop every judicial examination of issues of fact
or law, but instead, only those judicial examinations that conform to the
conventional concept of a trial.' 62  Under this restricted definition, a
trial would consist of those judicial proceedings that include the impanel-
ing of the jury, opening statements by counsel, admission of evidence,
examination and cross examination of witnesses, closing statements by
counsel, and instructions to the jury, followed by a final order.
The elements of a trial that are listed above are contained in sec-
tion 2315.01 of the Ohio Revised Code.' This section of the code sets
out the proper course of procedure to be followed in a civil trial. It is
not necessary for all these components to be present for there to be a
trial, as long as the opportunity existed for the presence of each com-
ponent. As an example, the absence of witnesses during the proceed-
ing would not impair the characterization of the proceeding as a trial so
long as the lack of witnesses was due to the choice of the participants,
and not to the nature of the proceeding. 64
By listing these elements, section 2315.01 partially defines a trial.
Thus, it would appear that section 2311.01, which sets out the defini-
tion of a trial, should not be read as the complete definition of a trial.
When read in light of this accompanying section of the code which
further refines the concept of a trial, the definition of a trial does not ap-
pear to be as vague as it originally seemed. Therefore, with respect to
an action at law, a trial should be defined as a judicial examination of the
issues in controversy, whether of law or fact, resulting in a final order,
and conducted pursuant to the procedural steps enumerated in section
2315.01 of the Ohio Revised Code.
B. Special Proceedings
The statutory definition of a trial, contained in section 2311.01 of
the Ohio Revised Code, includes both actions and proceedings.'6 An
action is defined as an ordinary proceeding which involves process and
pleadings and ends in a final order. 66  A special proceeding, however,
is not defined by the code. As a result, special proceedings are gener-
ally determined on a case by case basis. 6 7
1. The conventional concept of a trial appears to be the one used by the Ohio Rules
Advisory Committee. See note 6 supra.
"8 OHmo REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.01 (Page 1954). After providing for the impaneling
of the jury, this section fists the following components as elements of a trial: (A) Opening
statements by the parties. (B) Presentation of evidence by the party who has the burden
of going forward. This would include both physical evidence and testimony of witnesses.
(C) Presentation of evidence by opposing party, the evidence being confined to that of
rebuttal. (D) Closing statements by both parties. (E) Jury instructions submitted to the
court by both parties for the charge to the jury. (F) The court's charge to the jury.
16 The opportunity for cross examination of an opponent's witnesses is crucial to a
trial. See notes 206-07 and accompanying text, infra.
165 OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2311.01 (Page 1954). See note 1 and accompanying text,
supra.
166 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.01 (Page 1954).
I" "Neither the General Assembly nor this court has attempted to define with specif-
icity the identifying characteristics of a 'special proceeding' under R.C. 2505.02. In-
19761
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A special proceeding, as that term is known today, can be traced
to the adoption in Ohio of the Field Code in 1853. The merger of law
and equity into one form of action resulted in a unified code of proce-
dure by which a party was able to prosecute another for a wrong suf-
fered. Thus, all of the forms of actions that existed prior to 1853,
whether in equity or at law, were codified into a single form called a
civil action.'6o When the law conferred a right upon a person, the en-
forcement of which would not be accomplished through one of the forms
of action codified in the Field Code of 1853, the judicial proceeding that
followed was not an ordinary proceeding, but rather a special proceed-
ing.1es Thus a special proceeding may be characterized generally as any
judicial proceeding that does not follow the procedure set out in either
the Ohio Revised Code or the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure with respect
to the prosecution of an action.
70
While this explanation of a special proceeding may seem less than
illuminating, an examination of the definition of an action may
tend to shed some light on special proceedings. The Ohio Revised Code
provides that an action, or ordinary proceeding, is begun by process
and pleadings.' 71  A special proceeding, on the other hand, is initiated
by application to the court. In Missionary Society of the M. E. Church
v. Ely, 172 the court drew upon this distinction, stating that in an ordinary
proceeding a party prosecutes another to enforce a legal right. In a
special proceeding, however, a party seeks his remedy or relief by means
of direct application to the court. 73 While only infrequently employed,
special proceedings have been held to cover those situations involving
an award of attorney's fees,174 the validity and priority of liens, 175 the
stead, each case has been decided by reviewing the specific proceeding in question."
Kennedy v. Chalfin, 38 Ohio St. 2d 85, 88, 301 N.E.2d 233, 235 (1974).
"' Code of Civil Procedure of the State of Ohio, § 3, 1853 Ohio Laws 57 (codified
at Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2307.02 (Page 1954) (repealed 1970)). See Otso R. Civ. P. 2.
169 Watson v. Sullivan, 5 Ohio St. 43, 44 (1855). See also Village of Canfield v.
Brobst, 71 Ohio St. 42, 48, 72 N.E. 459, 460 (1904).
170 The distinction between an action and a special proceeding has been retained by
the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule I(C) states that certain special statutory pro-
ceedings are exempt from the general applicability of the rules. The nature of the
particular special proceeding will necessitate special provisions not found in the Ohio
Rules of Civil Procedure. See the example illustrating this point in the Ohio Rules Ad-
visory Committee Staff Note to Omio R. Civ. P. 1(C).
171 Onio REv. CODE ANN. § 2307.01 (Page 1954).
172 56 Ohio St. 405, 47 N.E. 537 (1897).
173 Id. at 407, 47 N.E. at 538. The issue in Missionary Society was whether an order
of the common pleas court refusing to admit a will to probate was a final order from a
special proceeding. The court drew the distinction between a special proceeding and an
action, stating:
[W]e suppose that any ordinary proceedings in a court of justice, by which a party
prosecutes another for the enforcement or protection of a right, the redress or
prevention of a wrong, or the punishment of a public offense, involving process
and pleadings, and ending in a judgment, is an action, while every proceeding
other than an action, where a remedy is sought by an original application to a
court for a judgment or an order, is a special proceeding.
Id. at 407, 47 N.E. at 538. This definition of an action has now been codified in the
Revised Code. Otno REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.01 (Page 1954).
114 Hlavin v. Plechaty Co., 28 Ohio App. 2d 43, 274 N.E.2d 570 (1971).
175 St. Clair Say. Ass'n v. Jansen, 40 Ohio App. 2d 211, 318 N.E.2d 538 (1973).
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enforcement of a divorce decree, 7 and the discharge of an attachment
of property.177 In all of the above examples the remedy was sought by
direct application to the court. In this respect, a special proceeding re-
sembles a hearing on a motion more than a trial.'
78
The concept of a special proceeding was further refined by the Ohio
Supreme Court in the case of In re Estate of Wyckoff.179 The court
stated that a special proceeding was essentially an independent judicial
proceeding initiated by a petition to the court, in which no other plead-
ings need be filed and only notice to interested parties, not service of
summons, was required. 80 This definition of special proceeding is con-
sistent with the previously stated purpose of a special proceeding; that
is, the means by which a party can enforce a legal right for which the
Rules set out no procedure to be followed.' 8' In a special proceeding
the petition,' along with any responsive papers the court might re-
quest, will frame the issues to be decided.
A special proceeding fits the definition of a trial, as set out by sec-
tion 2311.01 of the Ohio Revised Code, for it involves a judicial exami-
nation of the issues of law and fact. As a trial, a special proceeding
must end in a final order. Section 2505.02 of the Revised Code sets out
a separate test for the finality of an order in a special proceeding:
8 3
the order is final when it affects a substantial right of a party. In con-
trast, an order is only final in an action when that order affects a sub-
stantial right of a party, determines the action, and prevents a judg-
ment. Thus, for an order to be final in a civil action, the order must
terminate the lawsuit. 184 In a special proceeding, however, a final or-
17' Zywiczynski v. Zywiczynski, 82 Ohio App. 96, 80 N.E.2d 807 (1947).
'7 Watson v. Sullivan, 5 Ohio St. 43 (1855).
178 See notes 235-36 and accompanying text, infra.
179 166 Ohio St. 354, 142 N.E.2d 660 (1957).
180 Id. at 358, 142 N.E.2d at 664.
181 Id. This concept of a special right was first proposed in Missionary Soc'y of the
M. E. Church v. Ely, 56 Ohio St. 405, 47 N.E. 537 (1897), wherein the court stated:
The law having conferred the right, and authorized an application to a court of
justice to enforce it, the proceeding upon such application is of a judicial nature,
and not being an action within the sense of the code, it follows that it belongs to
that class known as special proceedings.
Id. at 408, 47 N.E. at 538. In State v. Collins, 24 Ohio St. 2d 107, 265 N.E.2d 261 (1970),
the court held that a pre-trial proceeding on a motion to suppress evidence in a criminal
case was a special proceeding. The Collins court based its conclusion on In re Estate of
Wyckoff and Missionary Society, holding that a special proceeding existed when a right
was conferred on a party and the law authorized enforcement of that right by a direct ap-
plication to the court. Id. at 109, 265 N.E.2d at 262-63. The holding in Collins is dubious,
for it ignores the fact that the hearing on the motion was an integrated part of the crim-
inal prosecution, and not an independent branch of it. Thus, in deciding the case, the
court failed to consider the differences between a hearing and a special proceeding.
12 A petition may be in the form of a motion during the course of a civil action
where the issue raised is not one that was raised by the original pleadings. Where the
special proceeding is not contained within a civil action, the petition will be in the form
of an application to the court.
183 OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2505.02 (Page 1954). For the text of section 2505.02
see note 24 supra.
184 Id. Where there are multiple parties in a lawsuit, the dismissal of one party is a
final order when the court states that there is no just reason to delay an appeal. OHo
R. Civ. P. 54(B). In such a case, the final order terminates the action with respect to 37Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1976
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der need not terminate the judicial examination, so long as it affects a
substantial right.8 5
A special proceeding may be an independent proceeding or a proceed-
ing relating to an independent aspect of an ongoing civil action. One
example of a special proceeding within a civil action is an application
for attorney's fees. 8 6 The application and subsequent proceeding,
while arising out of the action, are collateral to the action. In Mitchell v.
Crain 8 7 the court construed the term "final order" to include any order
of the court that gave final effect to the central purpose of an inde-
pendent branch of the litigation. A special proceeding that is contained
within a civil action will focus upon issues that are separate and distinct
from the issues of the action itself.18 8  In such a situation, a special
proceeding is a proceeding within a proceeding. Thus, a special proceed-
ing may begin and end within the course of a civil action. Because the
order resulting from a special proceeding is a final one, the losing party
has an immediate right to an appeal, even though the action out of which
the special proceeding arose has not yet terminated. 8 9  Moreover, be-
that party, thereby satisfying the test for finality in a civil action. Alexander v. Buckeye
Pipe Line Co., 49 Ohio St. 2d 158, 359 N.E.2d 702 (1977).
i'5 In Kelly v. Runyon, 170 Ohio St. 94, 162 N.E.2d 843 (1959), the court held that an
application to the court by a minor to strike a journal entry approving an unliquidated
tort claim was a special proceeding. By vacating the prior settlement, the defendant
was now subject to liability in an action on the plaintiff's tort claim. Accordingly, this
reinstatement of potential liability affected a substantial right of the defendant. Id. at 96,
162 N.E.2d at 844-45.
186 Hlavin v. Plechaty Co., 28 Ohio App. 2d 43, 274 N.E.2d 570 (1971).
187 108 Ohio App. 143, 144-45, 161 N.E.2d 80, 83 (1958). The "independent branch"
theory may be traced back to the adoption of the Field Code in 1853. In Teaff v.
Hewitt, 1 Ohio St. 511 (1853) the court stated:
A final decree is one which determines and disposes of the whole merits of the
cause before the court, or a branch of the cause, which is separate and distinct
from other parts of the case, reserving no further questions or directions for future
determination; so that it will not be necessary to bring the cause, or that separate
branch of the cause, again before the court for further decision.
Id. at 520. The above quote was relied upon by the court in Sellman v. Schaaf, 17 Ohio
App. 2d 69, 73-74, 244 N.E.2d 494, 498 (1969) to distinguish between a special proceed-
ing and an action. While in SeUman the dismissal of one claim was separate from the
remainder of the case, both claims had been raised in the plaintiff's complaint. Hence
both claims were part of the civil action and there could be no finding of a special pro-
ceeding.
188 In Kennedy v. Chalfin, 38 Ohio St. 2d 85, 310 N.E.2d 233 (1974), the plaintiff ar-
gued that a motion for attorney's fees and expenses had been determined in a special pro-
ceeding. In that case, the expenses requested were to compensate the plaintiff for the costs
incurred due to the failure of the defendant to appear at a deposition. The court held
that the overruling of the plaintiff's motion was not a final order arising out of a special
proceeding. The court based its conclusion on prior case law, holding that discovery
orders were part of the action being tried, not subject to immediate appellate review.
While the decision in Kennedy seems correct, a very good argument could be made in
favor of a special proceeding. The issue in the proceeding was whether or not the
defendant should be compelled to pay attorney's fees. While the proceeding may be in-
cluded under the heading of "discovery procedures," unlike the cases relied on by the court
in Kennedy, the issue was not the scope of discovery which would be an integrated part
of the ongoing action, but instead, attorney's fees. Thus the issue in the proceeding was
severable from the rest of the action. Moreover, the issue raised by the plaintiff's
application to the court was not one raised in the original complaint.
189 OHio R. Civ. P. 54(A).
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cause a special proceeding is a trial, the unsuccessful party may pre-
serve his right to appeal and seek review of the order in the trial court by
filing a motion for a new trial.190
The recent case of Heller v. Heller'9' has shed some light on the
nebulous area of special proceedings, albeit, inadvertently. In Heller,
the plaintiff filed a motion with the court requesting an award of at-
torney's fees for expenses she incurred in her previous divorce action.
At the time the motion was made, a divorce had already been
granted to the plaintiff. The court granted the plaintiff's motion for
attorney's fees and the defendant filed a motion for a new trial. The
court denied the motion and the defendant subsequently filed an
appeal.
In its original journal entry, the court of appeals held that the de-
fendant's motion for a new trial was not proper, because the order grant-
ing attorney's fees arose from a hearing, rather than a trial. The court
treated the motion for a new trial as a motion for rehearing and dis-
missed the appeal as untimely. 192 The court in Heller relied on the
analogous case of Taray v. Sadof'193 to arrive at its conclusion. In
Taray the plaintiff filed a motion for an increase in alimony. The motion
was granted, but the order granting the increase was subsequently
amended in favor of the defendant. The plaintiff filed a motion for re-
hearing with the trial court. Seven weeks later the motion for rehearing
was overruled by the trial court and the plaintiff then filed her notice of
appeal. In dismissing the appeal as untimely, the appellate court held
that the motion for rehearing was not equivalent to a Rule 59 motion for
a new trial which would have suspended the time for appeal, but rather,
more closely resembled a Rule 60(B) motion for relief from judgment.1'9 4
Upon the defendant's motion for reconsideration 195 to the court of
appeals, the court in Heller reversed its prior decision. 96 In its second
opinion the court of appeals held that the defendant's motion for a new
trial was proper, and that therefore, the appeal had been timely filed.
The Heller court, basing its second decision on the statutory definition
of a trial, concluded that the granting of the motion for attorney's fees
involved a judicial examination of that issue.
While the court in Heller arrived at the correct result, it did so by a
190 OHIO R. Civ. P. 59(A).
'9' Heller v. Heller, No. 34381 (Ohio Ct. App., Cuyahoga Cty., filed Jan. 15, 1976).
192 Id. slip op. at 3. Additional facts are needed to explain the Heller case. After
the appellee had filed her motion for attorney's fees, the court set a date for a hearing.
Before the day of the hearing the court postponed the hearing to a later date. A few
hours after the rescheduling, the Judge notified the parties that he had cancelled the
hearing completely and would rule on the motion. It was from the ruling on the motion,
which occurred without a hearing, that the appellant filed his motion for new trial.
193 71 Ohio Op. 2d 203, 331 N.E.2d 448 (Ct. App. 1974). See also Kauder v. Kauder,
38 Ohio St. 2d 265, 313 N.E.2d 797 (1974).
I d. at 204, 331 N.E.2d at 449.
s The motion for reconsideration at the appellate court level is governed by the
appellate rules of procedure. OHIO R. ApP. P. 26. It is not the same as the common law
motion for reconsideration that exists at the trial court level.
196 Heller v. Heller, No. 34381 (Ohio Ct. App., Cuyahoga Cty., filed Feb. 4, 1976).
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tenuous route, creating unnecessary confusion between a trial and a hear-
ing.197 The Heller opinion may be read as allowing the motion for new
trial to be applied to any judicial determination, be it a trial or a hearing.
Thus, the opinion is overly broad, with the potential of effectively de-
stroying the time limitations imposed by Appellate Rule 4(A). The
same result could have been reached in Heller on the basis that the
application for attorney's fees constituted a special proceeding. The
act of granting the motion was a final order which affected a substantial
right of the defendant. Moreover, the proceeding involved an issue that
was separate and distinct from the action for divorce. In Heuer, al-
though the motion for attorney's fees arose out of the action for divorce,
it was an independent branch of that litigation. In addition, the plaintiff
in Heller made her motion directly to the court. Thus the proceeding
was begun by an application to the court, as in a special proceeding,
not by a pleading against the defendant as in the case of a civil action.
It seems apparent that the order granting the attorney's fees in Heller
arose from a special proceeding, not from a hearing on a motion.
The question of whether or not a proceeding is a special proceeding
will be determined on a case by case basis. Section 2315.01 of the
Ohio Revised Code, governing trial proceedure, relates only to the pro-
cedure to be followed at the trial of a civil action.' 98 A trial in a special
proceeding does not follow any standard course of procedure. Thus, the
earlier advocated proposal, that the statutory definition of a trial (as
contained in section 2311.01 of the Ohio Revised Code), should be sup-
plemented by section 2315.01, relates only to trials in civil actions, not to
those in special proceedings. The proposed supplementation of the stat-
utory definition of a trial was offered as an attempt to distinguish be-
tween a hearing and a trial of a civil action. 99 A special proceeding
does not fall neatly into either one of these categories, for while in many
respects it resembles a hearing on a motion, if is nonetheless expressly
included in the definition of a trial.200
C. A Hearing as a Trial
Under the definition of a trial contained in section 2311.01 of the
Ohio Revised Code, a hearing on a motion could be characterized as a
trial. Although a hearing is begun by a motion, as opposed to a plead-
ing, the hearing may cover some of the same issues framed by the plead-
ings in the civil action out of which the hearing arose. In that event,
the hearing would be a judicial examination of issues of law or fact, and
if the hearing ended in a final order, it would seem that the hearing
meets all the requirements of a trial. Furthermore, if the hearing termi-
197 A more detailed discussion of the two types of proceedings is handled in a later
part of this Note. See notes 225-30 and accompanying text, infra.
'9 OMo REV. CooE ANN. § 2315.01 (Page 1954).
, See text accompanying notes 162-64 supra.
20 "'Thus it seems that the statute [section 2311.01] expressly includes the word
proceeding' in its definition of a trial." O'Connor v. Graf, 110 Ohio App. 398, 400,
160 N.E.2d 374, 376 (1959).
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nates the action, it would have served the same function as a trial; that
is, the determination of the rights of the parties to the lawsuit. This would
mean that upon receiving an adverse ruling in a hearing, resulting in a
final order, a party could file a motion for a new trial pursuant to Ohio
Rule 59. Based on this theory, it has been suggested that a motion
for a new trial could be applied to any matter decided by the court
without a jury.20'
Part of the confusion concerning hearings is based upon the present
definition of that term. Prior to the adoption of the Field Code in Ohio
in 1853,202 there were two types of actions; trials at law and hearings in
equity. The definition of a hearing in the sense of the equitable coun-
terpart to a trial at law has been abandoned and is no longer employed
in the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure. The term "hearing," as used by
the Ohio Rules, contemplates the determination of motions that arise
during the course of an action. A hearing is intended to be merely one
component of a trial and not, in and of itself, a trial.
20 3
An examination of the Ohio Rules will also reveal that a hearing was
intended to be something distinct from a trial. Ohio Rule 32(A), for
example, states that any deposition intended to be used as evidence
must be filed with the court at least one day before the trial or hear-
ing. 20 4 Similarly, Ohio Rule 7(B) states that all motions must be in
writing unless made during the trial or hearing. 20 5 By the use of the
disjunctive connector between the words "trial" and "hearing" it is clear
that two separate concepts were intended by the drafters of the Ohio
Rules. Because a hearing is not a trial within the framework of the
Ohio Rules, a motion for a new trial will not lie after an adverse ruling
on a motion at a hearing. Therefore, a motion styled as a motion for a
new trial made after a hearing will not have the effect of suspending the
time for appeal even though the order was final. The motion at best
wifl be regarded as a motion for rehearing.
The fact that a hearing was meant to be something other than a
trial is not only clear from the language of the Ohio Civil Rules, but also
from prior case law. In Trustees v. McClannahan, the Ohio Supreme
Court stated that a hearing on a motion does not take the place of a
trial.206  The court based its conclusion on the fact that the only evi-
dence offered at the hearing consisted of affidavits. These affidavits
201 11 WRIcHT & M.LER, supra note 30, at § 2804. See note 251 infra.
202 Code of Civil Procedure of the State of Ohio, § 3, 1853 Ohio Laws 57 (codified
at Omio REv. CODE ANN. § 2307.02 (Page 1954) (repealed 1970)).
203 The voluntary dismissal statute in Illinois, while similar to Ohio's, allows a plaintiff
to dismiss his case without prejudice "before trial or hearing begins." Civil Practice Act
§ 52, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, § 52 (1975). There is no further explanation of the term
"hearing" as it is used in that statute. As a result, many problems have arisen as to
whether a hearing is used in the sense of a preliminary motion or as the equitable counter-
part to a trial. See Comment, The Vanishing Right of a Plaintiff to Voluntarily Dismiss
his Action, 9 J. MAR. J. PRAc. & Pioc. 583 (1976).
204 Ouoo R. Civ. P. 32(A).
205 OHIo R. Civ. P. 7(B)(2).
206 53 Ohio St. 403, 411, 42 N.E. 34, 36 (1895).
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did not afford the opposing party an opportunity for cross examination.20 7
It was proposed earlier in this Note, that the definition of a trial pro-
vided in section 2311.01 of the Ohio Revised Code should not be read in
isolation, but rather, with reference to section 2315.01. One of the ele-
ments of trial procedure listed in section 2315.01 is the right of ex-
amination and cross examination of witnesses. While this right is an
essential feature of a trial, it is generally not a right afforded to parties
in a hearing, for a hearing is usually conducted in a summary manner.
Moreover, some of the other elements listed in section 2315.01 of the
code are also unavailable to parties in a hearing. Therefore, the pro-
posed supplementation of the statutory definition of a trial would assist
in differentiating between a hearing and a trial in those circumstances
where the line of demarcation is not clearly drawn. Further, this reading
of the definition of a trial would be in keeping with prior case law in
Ohio, as exemplified in McClannahan. The opportunity to cross exam-
ine an opposing party's witness is indispensable to the adversary system,
and is one of the prime characteristics that distinguishes a trial from
a hearing.
In Railway Company v. Thurstin2°8 the court held that the concept of
a hearing was not identical either in nature or effect to that of a trial.
In Thurstin, a motion to dismiss was granted after the admission of affi-
davits and oral testimony. The appellant filed a notice of appeal from
the order of the lower court granting the motion to dismiss. In dis-
missing the appeal, the appellate court held that the hearing on the mo-
tion was not a trial. Because the appellate court's power was limited
to review of those errors that occured during trial, the court concluded
that it had no jurisdiction to review the lower court's dismissal. The
Thurstin court based its conclusion on the statutory definition of a trial
as the examination of the issues in controversy.2 0° Issues, however, are
to be framed by the pleadings.2 1  The questions raised during the
hearing on the motion to dismiss did not go to the issues framed by the
pleadings, hence, there had been no trial from which an appeal would lie.
It has been repeatedly recognized by the courts that a hearing on a
motion for summary judgment is not a trial. A motion for summary
judgment will only be granted when there are no genuine issues of ma-
terial fact to be tried.2 11 When the issues presented by the pleadings are
genuine, they must be resolved at trial. Thus, summary judgment will
207 id.
200 44 Ohio St. 525, 9 N.E. 232 (1886).
200 Id. at 528, 9 N.E. at 233-34. The definition of a trial that the court examined in
Thurstin is the same one that currently appears in the Ohio Revised Code. See note 1
and accompanying text, supra.
210 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2311.02 (Page 1954).
211 Bowlds v. Smith, 114 Ohio App. 21, 180 N.E.2d 184 (1961). "[Tlhe purpose of
the statute [former version of summary judgment rule] is to terminate useless and expen-
sive litigation when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. It is to be used
when issues are feigned and when there is really nothing to try." Id. at 28, 180 N.E.2d
at 188-89. The court in Bowlds based its conclusion on the case of Petroff v. Commer-
cial Motor Freight, Inc., 82 Ohio L. Abs. 433, 165 N.E.2d 840 (Ct. App. 1960). See also
DeWitt Motors v. Bodnark, 84 Ohio L. Abs. 48, 169 N.E.2d 660 (Ct. App. 1960).
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be granted by the court in lieu of a trial, and therefore, such a proceeding
will be something other than a trial, namely, a hearing. A trial and a
hearing on a motion for summary judgment are also distinguishable, be-
cause in a summary judgment proceeding the court must determine
whether there are any issues of material fact based on only a limited
right to examine the evidence." 2 While oral testimony is a common and
essential part of a trial, Ohio Rule 56(C) limits the court's scope of exam-
ination in a hearing on a motion for summary judgment to written
records.2 13  Moreover, Ohio Rule 56(A) states that if an action has been
set for trial, a motion for summary judgment may only be made upon
leave of court.2 14 This language indicates that a trial and a hearing on a
motion for summary judgment were intended to be two separate en-
tities. Therefore, at least with respect to summary judgment, it is clear
that a hearing on a motion is not a trial.
With respect to hearings predicated on motions other than for sum-
mary judgment, the distinction between a trial and a hearing has not
been as clear cut. In Roscoe v. Kolb21 5 the court held that a motion for
a new trial would properly lie from the granting of a motion to dismiss
for failure to join a necessary party. After the order of dismissal with
prejudice had been journalized, the plaintiff moved to vacate the order
and also for leave to amend the complaint. The trial court overruled
both of these motions, and the plaintiff appealed. The defendant moved
to dismiss the appeal which had been filed out of rule.21  The appel-
late court held that the plaintiff's motion to vacate was essentially a mo-
tion for a new trial. Because of this conclusion, the court held that the
appeal had been timely filed. The court based its decision on the statu-
tory definition of a new trial as it existed at that time, stating that a new
trial was a re-examination of the issues of law or fact.
2 17
212 Morris v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 15 Ohio St. 2d 184, 239 N.E.2d 94 (1968).
"It is important to remember that a summary judgment proceeding is not a trial, but a
hearing upon a motion. The court must determine whether there is a genuine issue as
to any material fact, and the court's decision must rest upon specifically prescribed
sources of evidence." Id. at 185, 239 N.E.2d at 95. The predecessor to Ohio Rule 56 re-
lating to summary judgments in effect at the time this case was brought restricted the
examination to written evidence. Code of Civil Procedure of the State of Ohio, § 1, 1959
Ohio Laws 63 (codified at Orno REV. CODE ANN. § 2311.041 (Page 1954) (repealed 1970)).
213 Ouio R. Civ. P. 56(C) states in part:
Summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, written admissions, affidavits, transcripts of evidence
in the pending case, and written stipulations of fact, if any, timely filed in the
action, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
214 Onio R. Civ. P. 56(A).
215 93 Ohio App. 352, 113 N.E.2d 746 (1953).
211 Id. at 353, 113 N.E.2d at 747.
217 Code of Civil Procedure of the State of Ohio, § 297, 1853 Ohio Laws 7, amended by
Act of July 10, 1945, § 1, 1945 Ohio Laws 366 (codified at OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2321.17 (Page 1954) (repealed 1970)). This code section defined a new trial and listed
the grounds that were a basis for the motion. A new trial was defined as "[A] re-exami-
nation, in the same court, of the issues after a final order, judgment, or decree by the
court."
Section 2321.17 was expressly repealed in 1970 with the enactment of the Ohio Rules
of Civil Procedure. 1970 Ohio Laws 3017. This Act further provided that:
Unless the court shall determine that one of such sections, or some part thereof,
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Part of the problem with the decision in Roscoe lies in the court's use
of the term "issue." The appellate court did not employ the term in
the restricted sense of the Ohio Revised Code's definition.218  Instead,
it used the term in a more liberal sense, thereby encompassing the dis-
pute that was before the court at the hearing on the motion to dis-
miss. 21 9  The holding of the court, however, is substantially weakened
as the underlying assumption disintegrates. The assumption made by the
appellate court in Roscoe was that the lower court had examined an
issue of law at the hearing on the motion to dismiss. While the failure
to join a proper party may have been a source of conflict between the
parties, it was not an issue as that term is defined by the Ohio Revised
Code, because it did not arise out of the pleadings of the parties. 220
Thus, although the lower court made its decision on a matter of law,
it did not do so on an issue of law. The plaintiff's motion, therefore,
should not have been characterized as a motion for a new trial, but in-
stead, as a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Ohio Rule 60.221
The holding in Roscoe, standing alone, can be read for the proposition
that the hearing on a motion to dismiss with prejudice for failure to
join a proper party constitutes a trial, from which a motion for a new
trial will lie. The court in Roscoe based its decision on an overly broad
reading of the definition of issues and of a new trial. This is similar to
the approach that was taken in the Heller case.22  The difference be-
tween the two cases is that in Heller there was an alternate ground,
the use of a special proceeding, for permitting the motion for a new trial.
With Roscoe, however, there were no alternate grounds to justify the
result.
The defense raised by the defendant in Roscoe would be equivalent
to a Rule 12(B)(7) motion to dismiss in the Ohio Rules. 22 The motion
to dismiss in Roscoe, however, was made prior to the closing of the
pleading stage. 22 4  A motion to dismiss at that point in the lawsuit
has clearly not been superseded by such rules and that in the absence of such sec-
tion or part thereof being effective, there would be no applicable standard of
procedure proscribed by either statutory law or rule of court.
Id. at 3021. While Ohio Rule 59 superseded section 2321.17 with respect to motions
for a new trial, the rule fails to provide a definition of a new trial. This absence was
probably due more to an attempt by the Ohio Rules Advisory Committee to conform to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure than to a decision to delete the definitional provision.
in Heller v. Heller, No. 34381 (Ohio Ct. App., Cuyahoga Cty., filed Feb. 4, 1976), the
Cuyahoga County Court of Appeals relied on mne iepealed definition of a new trial to find
that the defendant's motion for a new trial was proper. Id. at 3. In light of the language
of the act quoted above, it would appear that the decision in Heller has put that part of
section 2321.17 of the code defining a new trial back into effect. While section 2321.17 in
general was repealed, the provision defining a new trial was not clearly superseded by
Ohio Rule 59. Moreover, in the absence of this provision, there is no definition of a new
trial in either the Ohio Revised Code or the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure.
218 Onto REv. CODE ANN. § 2311.02 (Page 1954).
219 93 Ohio App. at 354-56, 113 N.E.2d at 748.
220 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. t 2311.02 (Page 1954).
221 OIo R. Civ. P. 60(B). See note 194 and accompanying text, supra.
m See note 195-96 and accompanying text, supra.
n3 OHIo R. Civ. P. 12(B)(7).
"I The defendant's motion to dismiss was filed two years after the plaintiff's origi-
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would be governed by Ohio Rule 12(D). 225  This latter rule expressly
states that all defenses raised in a Rule 12(B) motion shall be heard and
determined before trial.226  Upon examination of Ohio Rule 12(D) it is
clear that a motion of this nature, raised before trial, will be deter-
mined by a hearing, not by a trial. First of all, Rule 12(D) states
that motions raised under Rule 12(B) "shall be heard," as opposed to
"shall be tried." 27  Secondly, Ohio Rule 12(D) states that the motion
shall be determined "before the trial." If the hearing on the motion
to dismiss was itself a trial, it would be impossible to determine the
merits of the motion "before trial." Therefore, under the current Ohio
Rules of Civil Procedure, a decision similar to that in Roscoe would be
erroneous. The determination of a Rule 12(B) motion to dismiss would
be at a hearing, not a trial and a motion for a new trial pursuant to
Rule 59 could not lie.228  Such a motion could only be a motion for a
rehearing and would not stop the running of the time to appeal.
Similar to other types of hearings discussed above, a hearing on a
motion for judgment on the pleadings would also not be deemed a trial.
Ohio Rule 12(C) states that a motion for judgment on the pleadings may
only be made if that motion will not delay the trial. 229 The language
of this rule indicates that something other than a trial is anticipated as
the vehicle for determining the merits of the motion. Instead the mo-
tion for judgment on the pleadings is closer in comparison to a hearing on
a motion for summary judgment.23° The court does not examine the
issues at a hearing on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, but in-
stead, examines the pleadings to determine if any issues exist to be tried.
As was indicated earlier, the effect of allowing a motion for a new
trial to lie from a hearing on a pretrial motion would be to make the hear-
ing a trial. This result, was neither contemplated nor desired by the Ohio
nal complaint. Thus it would be fair to infer that by the time the defendant had filed
his motion to dismiss, he had already filed his answer. The motion to dismiss was made,
however, before the commencement of trial. Therefore, the motion would be regarded as
a preliminary motion, to be determined before trial. Omo R. Civ. P. 12(D).
w5 Id.
226 Id. See note 72 supra.
20 id.
228 Carney v. Simmonds, 49 Cal. 2d 84, 315 P.2d 305 (1957) is a case similar to
Roscoe. The motion to dismiss in Carney would be similar to an Ohio Rule 12(B)(6)
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The
procedural facts of the Carney case are similar to Roscoe, and need not be repeated.
The California Supreme Court affirmed the use of the motion for a new trial after a motion
to dismiss, where there had been no previous trial. One writer, in evaluating the
probable effects of Carney, stated that it would lead to an increase in new trial motions,
but would also speed up the litigation process by eliminating the need for appeals.
Comment, 10 STAN. L. REV. 581, 583 (1958). This is doubtful, however, because re-
gardless of the outcome of the subsequent trial, one of the parties will probably appeal.
The probability of an appeal would be even greater where the result at the trial would be
the opposite of the motion to dismiss.
' OHIo R. Civ. P. 12(C). For the text of Rule 12(C), see note 80 supra.
210 In reality, a hearing on a motion for judgment on the pleadings is more re-
strictive than a hearing on a motion for summary judgment. In determining a motion
for judgment on the pleadings, the court will look only to the face of the pleadings.
Outside evidence is not considered by the court as it would be in determining a motion
for summary judgment. Peterson v. Teodosio, 34 Ohio St. 2d 161, 297 N.E.2d 113 (1973).
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Rules Advisory Committee. An examination of the plaintiff's right to
voluntarily dismiss the lawsuit pursuant to Ohio Rule 41(A) will exem-
plify the problem.23' If a hearing on a motion could be characterized as
a trial, then the plaintiff would no longer have the right to dismiss the
action without prejudice once the hearing has commenced. This result,
however, is contrary to existing Ohio case law which has held that a
party may dismiss his claim without prejudice after an adverse ruling
has been made at a pretrial hearing, but prior to the journal entry by the
court.232  Moreover, the equating of a hearing to a trial would have the
effect of advancing to the early stages of the litigation the plaintiff's right
to dismiss his lawsuit. Thus, a hearing on a pretrial motion to dismiss
with prejudice would cut off the plaintiff's right to voluntarily dismiss
in much the same way that the making of a motion for summary judg-
ment cuts off the plaintiff's right to dismiss in the federal system.2 33
This effect, however, was clearly rejected by the Ohio Rules Advisory
Committee, as reflected by the committee's choice to modify the federal
rule to permit the plaintiff an extended period of time to dismiss his
lawsuit.234
A final comparison should be made between a hearing and a special
proceeding. A special proceeding will determine the entire controversy
before the court, whereas a hearing goes only to those matters raised by
the motion. Moreover, a hearing may or may not terminate the proceed-
ing, depending on whether the hearing results in a final order. A sec-
ond distinction is that a special proceeding determines an issue inde-
pendently of the trial of the civil action, while a hearing on a motion is
concerned with a matter that is ancillary to the trial of the action.2 3
5
Finally, in a special proceeding, as in the trial of an action, there is a ju-
dicial examination of the issues involved. In a hearing, however, the
conflict focused upon by the court may not necessarily be an issue, as
23' Omo R. Civ. P. 41(A). See notes 28-29 and accompanying text, supra.
232 Standard Oil Co. v. Grice, 46 Ohio App. 2d 97, 345 N.E.2d 458 (1975). See note
78 supra.
23 FED. R. Civ. P. 41(a).
231 The rejection of a dismissal provision identical to that of the federal system was
discussed in the Ohio Rules Advisary Staff Note to OHio R. Civ. P. 41(A). See also note 49
supra.
A corollary question arises concerning the right of a plaintiff to voluntarily dismiss the
lawsuit after the court has granted an order for a new trial. If the effect of the court's order
is totally to eradicate the effect of the first trial and place the parties back at point zero,
then the plaintiff's right to dismiss without prejudice would be reinstated. This result,
while logically sound, would be contrary to the policy of protecting the defendant from
exposure to unnecessary, burdensome expenses. There has been no case to date in Ohio
deciding this particular effect of an order of a new trial.
A brief example will illustrate the utility of the above procedure. The plaintiff brings
an action in the state court and requests a jury trial. A trial is conducted, and the
verdict is rendered in favor of the plaintiff. The amount recovered, however, is far
less than what the plaintiff had expected. The plaintiff then files a timely motion for
a new trial pursuant to Ohio Rule 59(A)(4) (inadequate damages). If the motion is
granted, the plaintiff will then be free to dismiss the suit and recommence it elsewhere
(assuming that there is proper venue in some other state court or that the federal system
is open to him). The only penalty the plaintiff would incur would be payment of the pre-
vious court costs, as per Rule 41(D). See note 30 supra.
235 See notes 187-88 supra.
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that term is technically defined, even though the hearing may result in a
final order.23 6
In conclusion, a hearing on a motion is neither a trial of an action nor
a special proceeding. Therefore, a motion for a new trial will not lie from
a determination of the hearing. This will be true even in those cases
when the hearing results in a final order which terminates the action
between the parties. The only post-trial motions that will properly lie
from a final order in a hearing are the common law motions for rehear-
ing or reconsideration or a Rule 60(B) motion for relief from judgment.
None of these motions, however, will be effective in suspending the
time which the appellant has for filing his notice of appealYm
D. The Adoption of Federal Rule 59(e):
A Recommendation
Under current Ohio law, only a Rule 59 motion for a new trial or a
rule 50(B) motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict will toll the
thirty day time limit to file a notice of appeal.23s As previously stated,
a motion for a new trial will only lie when it is predicated upon a final or-
der that was rendered in a previous trial. Hence, a final order rendered
at a hearing as opposed to a trial, will not provide a basis for a motion
for a new trial. The appellant who finds himself in this position has the
option of either filing a motion for rehearing and taking his chances with
the trial court, or abandoning that avenue to relief by filing a notice
of appeal. The limitations imposed by Ohio Rule 59 dictate that a party
in this situation cannot have both.
In the federal system the appellant in the identical situation as that
outlined above is not placed in such a precarious position. This is due
to section (e) of Federal Rule 59 which gives the court additional power
to alter or amend a judgment. 3 9 The attractiveness of Federal Rule
59(e) lies in the fact that it is not limited solely to a judgment entered
from a trial, but will apply to a judgment that resulted from a hearing as
well.240  Section (e) of Federal Rule 59 is a partial codification of the
common law motion for rehearing.2 41 Section (e) in Federal Rule 59 re-
21 Omio REv. CODE ANN. § 2311.02 (Page 1954).
' OHIo R. App. P. 4(A). See notes 134-35 and accompanying text, supra.
23 OHIo R. App. P. 4(A). For the text of Rule 4(A), see note 134 supra.
239 FED. R. Civ. P. 59(e) provides: "(e) Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment. A
motion to alter or amend the judgment shall be served not later than 10 days after entry
of the judgment."
240 The title of the two rules governing motions for new trials is indicative of their scope.
Ohio Rule 59 is titled "New Trials." Federal Rule 59, on the other hand, is titled "New
Trials, Amendment of Judgment." Thus, while the Ohio Rule is limited to those situa-
tions involving a trial, the federal rule also applies to judgments, without delineating the
proceeding from which the judgment must arise.
241 In many cases a FED. R. Civ. P. 59(e) motion to alter or amend a judgment has been
characterized as a motion for reconsideration. Hattersley v. Bolt, 512 F.2d 209 (3rd Cir.
1975); Pacific Maritime Ass'n v. Quinn, 465 F.2d 108 (9th Cir. 1972); Theodoropoulos v.
Tbompson-Starrett Co., 418 F.2d 350 (2d Cir. 1969). Conversely, a motion for recon-
sideration directed to the trial court, has been regarded as a motion to alter or amend
pursuant to Rule 59(e). Pierre v. Jordan, 333 F.2d 951, 955 (9th Cir. 1964) cert. denied,
379 U.S. 974 (1965).
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moves the plight that an appellant is faced with in the Ohio system when
his lawsuit is terminated by a hearing rather than a trial.24 2  Federal
Rule 59(e) permits a party who has received an adverse judgment in a
hearing to seek both a rehearing at the trial level and an appeal to a
higher court. In the Ohio system the pursuit of one will most likely be
at the cost of the other.
A motion persuant to Federal Rule 59(e) is not a motion for a new
trial. It is a motion to alter or amend a judgment.2'u It applies to all
judgments of the court, not merely those from a trial. Because the post
judgment motion is a Rule 59 motion, it will still have the effect of sus-
pending the time for filing a notice of appeal. 44 Such an amendment to
Ohio Rule 59 would eliminate the incentive for a party to attempt to
manipulate the current operation of the rule and devise solutions to
problems the Ohio Rule was not designed to meet. There would be no
need for any manipulation where the same result could be achieved by
legitimate means. Moreover, such an amendment would minimize the
holdings of cases like Helle 2 45 and Roscoe.2 46
The question to consider in weighing the effects of a Rule 59(e) pro-
vision is whether or not a final order from which an appeal will immedi-
ately lie, but which resulted from a hearing on a motion, should be given
the protection of a suspended period of time to file a notice of appeal.
Stated otherwise, should a final order from a hearing be treated differ-
ently than a final order from a trial? The staff note accompanying Ohio
Rule 59 gives no indication why section (e) of the Federal Rule was not
adopted along with the rest of Federal Rule 59. Although one com-
mentator has suggested that the same result could be accomplished
through the language in the last sentence of Ohio Rule 59(A), this con-
clusion seems doubtful.2 47 One reason is that Federal Rule 59(a) has an
almost identical provision, yet a party must still resort to the use of Fed-
eral Rule 59(e) to secure review at the trial level of a final order from a
hearing without the risk of loss of appellate review.
2 48
242 In Walker v. Bank of America, 268 F.2d 16 (9th Cir. 1959) the court held that a
motion to alter or amend pursuant to Federal Rule 59(e) would suspend the time for filing
notice of appeal. As a Rule 59 motion, the motion to amend the judgment fit into the
exception to the 30 day filing requirement provided in Appellate Rule 4. This motion
could also be applied against a ruling on a pretrial motion to dismiss. Id. at 19-20.
213 FED R. Civ. P. 59(e). See generally, 11 WRICHT & MILLER, supra note 30, at §
2817.
244 Boggs v. Dravo Corp. 532 F.2d 897, 899 (3d Cir. 1976); Merrill, Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith v. Kurtenbach, 525 F.2d 1179, 1181 (8th Cir. 1975); Sonnenblick-
Goldman Corp. v. Nowalk, 420 F.2d 858, 859 (3rd Cir. 1970).
245 No. 34381 (Ohio Ct. App., Cuyahoga Cty., filed Feb. 4, 1976).
246 93 Ohio App. 352, 113 N.E.2d 746 (1953). See, e.g., American Fam. Life Ins. Co.
v. Planned Marketing Assocs., 389 F. Supp. 1141 (E.D. Va. 1974).
247 1 S. JACOBY, OHIO CIVIL PRAcrIcE, 438 (1970).
248 A second reason why it seems doubtful that the final sentence in Ohio Rule 59(A)
is a substitute for Federal Rule 59(e) is that the Ohio Rule refers to "actions tried," not
"motions heard," or more simply "judgments entered." Given this language, it would
seem that the final provision in Ohio Rule 59(A) would be limited in its application to
trials alone. Federal Rule 59(e), however, may be directed against any final order, even
in the absence of a trial. Parks v. "Mr. Ford," 68 F.R.D. 305, 308 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
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A consideration against a Federal Rule 59(e) type provision is that by
providing the appellant in this situation with two opportunities for re-
view, the proposed amendment would prolong the finality of the litiga-
tion while the appellant sought both avenues of review. At first glance
this result might seem undesirable and the opportunity for two methods
of review unnecessary. This dual method of review, however, is cur-
rently available to the losing party in a trial. It would seem to follow
that such methods should apply equally to all judgments, unless a suf-
ficient distinction can be made between a final order resulting from a
trial and one resulting from a hearing. Moreover, in the federal system,
where the losing party does have the ability to make a motion to alter or
amend a judgment from a hearing, it does not appear that this addi-
tional provision in Federal Rule 59 has proved unduly burdensome.
Finally, in the long run, the incorporation of a Federal Rule 59(e) provi-
sion in the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure would serve to greatly simplify
post-trial procedure.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Note has attempted to deal with the two problems that arise from
the use of the term "trial" by the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure. The
first problem, concerning the commencement of trial, could be solved
by amending the particular Ohio Civil Rules which create the problem.
For example, with respect to a plaintiff's right to voluntarily dismiss
his claim pursuant to Rule 41(A), the language could be changed from
the current "before the commencement of trial" to "before the jury is im-
paneled and sworn in actions triable to a jury."2 49  A similar amend-
ment could be made to Ohio Rule 54(C), concerning the plaintiff's
right to amend his demand for judgment. Such an amendment would
define a trial to include the impaneling of the jury. Hence, at the be-
ginning of the impaneling process, the plaintiff's rights with respect
to the above two mentioned rules would be terminated. The analysis
presented earlier in this Note concerning these two areas indicates that
the case law in Ohio would support this view of commencement of trial.
With respect to the deadline for filing a deposition intended to be
used during a trial, analysis of the case law in Ohio and of the language
of the rule shows that a different time limitation was intended than the
limitations of Ohio Rules 41(A) and 54(C). Hence an amendment to
Ohio Rule 32(A) would change the current wording of that rule from "at
least one day before the day of trial or hearing," to "at least one day be-
fore the day the deposition is intended to be used at the trial or hearing."
Thus a party would not lose his right to use a deposition in a trial once
249 The proposed amendment to Oiio R. Civ. P. 41(A) is nothing more than the
reinstatement of its originally proposed language. Proceedings of the Ohio Rules Ad-
visory Committee at 234 (Nov. 22, 1968) (on file with the Ohio Supreme Court Library).
See note 82 supra. An alternative means of amendment would be to leave the present
language of Ohio Rule 41(A) intact, but separately define the commencement of a trial in
a later part of the rule. This alternative approach has been adopted by the current
California Civil Code. See note 53 and accompanying text, supra.
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the trial had commenced so long as the opposing counsel had at least
one day of notice before such use.
Both of the above proposed amendments serve to delineate exactly
when a party has the option of exercising one of the rights conferred
upon him by the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure. While such amendments
would create an even wider gap between the language of the Ohio Rules
and the Federal Rules, upon which the Ohio Rules were modeled, the ef-
fect would be to eliminate the problems discussed in this Note. Thus,
the overall effect would be a narrowing of the gap between the two sets
of procedural rules, for as was stated earlier, the problems concerning
the plaintiff's right to dismiss or amend his demand for judgment do not
exist in the federal system.
250
The second problem discussed in this Note concerned the use of the
motion for a new trial in Ohio. Unlike the first problem, the issue in
question here is not due to any ambigious language in Ohio Rule 59,
but rather, the situations to which the rules have been applied. From
the language of Rule 59, it is clear that the rule was meant to apply to
final orders from a trial. The moving party is not satisfied with the re-
sult of the first trial and is requesting the court to grant a second trial.
For there to be a second trial, there has to have been a first.
The problem arises when the proceedings terminating in a final order
are not a trial, for to seek relief in such a case at the trial level will be to
preclude any chance of relief at the appellate level. As with the first
problem, this problem does not exist in the federal system. This is due
to the addition of section (e) to Federal Rule 59. This additional provi-
sion allows the federal courts to treat all final orders equally, whether
they were entered from a trial or a hearing."' Accordingly, because
Federal Rule 59(e) applies to all judgments, there is no need to determine
the type of proceedings involved. The addition of section (e) to Ohio
Rule 59 would likewise eliminate the necessity of distinguishing between
a hearing and a trial for the purposes of preserving all available avenues
of post-judgment relief.
PATRICK CARROLL
2-0 See note 6 and accompanying text, supra.
251 FED. R. Civ. P. 59, because of the additional provision of section (e), applies to all
judgments. By contrast, Onio R. Civ. P. 59 applies only to judgments from trials.
Technically, a motion pursuant to Federal Rule 59(e) is not a motion for new trial, but
rather, a motion to alter or amend a judgment. For its application there is no pre-
requisite that the judgment be rendered in a trial. Due to the fact that the motion to
alter or amend is a Rule 59 motion, it is commonly referred to as a motion for a new trial.
Thus, the statement by Professors Wright and Miller, cited and approved in Heller v.
Heller, No. 34381 (Ohio Ct: App., Cuyahoga Cty., filed Feb. 4, 1976), that a Rule 59 mo-
tion would apply to any matter decided by the court without a jury, is only true in those
instances where Rule 59 is not limited in its application to final orders from trials. See
note 201 and accompanying text, supra. Thus, the reliance on both this statement and fed-
eral case law by the court in Heller was misplaced, for the authority would only apply in a
situation using the Federal Rule 59 motion, not the more restrictive Ohio Rule 59 motion.
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